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CRACK BABIES AND THE CONSTITUTION: RUMINATIONS ABOUT




W AT should society do in response to a pregnant woman who uses
crack?1 The dangers to the fetus in such cases vary from no addic-
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system's response to crack addicted pregnant women. Many thanks to my research
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Moon, University of Houston Law Center, Class of 2002; and the University of
Houston Law Foundation for its financial support.
1. The current response to this problem is to criminally prosecute pregnant
women for using crack. This ignores the effects of other illegal drugs and alcohol
on the fetus, even though they can be just as damaging to the fetus and have long-
reaching effects on children. See LAURA E. GOMEZ, MISCONCEMvNG MOTHERS: LEG-
ISLATORS, PROSECUTORS, AND THE POLITICS OF PRENATAL DRUG ExPoSuRE 137 nn.8-9
(1997). Although popular pregnancy books discuss the effect of prescription
drugs, alcohol, tobacco and the work place environment on the fetus, our legal
system has focused on the use of crack cocaine. See id. at 12-13 (stating that
"among hard drugs currently popular in the United States, cocaine has generated
more popular, political, and media concern than other illicit drugs"). The use of
other illegal drugs by pregnant women, including heroin, which is considered
more dangerous than crack, does not receive the same attention from the media
and the legal system. See id. at 13 (noting that "while heroin is widely recognized to
be a more dangerous drug than cocaine, its use and abuse does not generate the
same elite or popular concern"). Furthermore, since legislation and prosecutorial
action focus on pregnant women addicts, there is little attention paid to the use of
drugs by men and the possible implication this may have on the fetus. Studies are
not conducted in this area, and therefore, we cannot determine if the focus of
legislation and prosecution needs to be shifted. See Mary Becker, Reproductive
Hazards AfterJohnson Controls, 31 Hous. L. REv. 43, 52 (1994) (noting that be-
(299)
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tion, to mild dependency, to severe neurological damage and convulsions
or even death. 2 Most people's initial reaction is revulsion-how can a wo-
man expose her unborn child to such serious risks? This often triggers
retributive notions of justice, which call for imprisonment and punish-
ment of the womanA On the other hand, pro-choice advocates see such
coercive tactics as undermining the right to privacy.
4
cause few studies have been done on potential male reproductive hazards, exact
risk of exposure from toxic agents to both male and female is unknown, and there-
fore, causation of fetal injury is difficult to prove).
2. The results of medical studies examining the use of crack and other drugs
by a pregnant woman on the unborn fetus are conflicting. Some doctors report
that the use of illegal drugs by pregnant women can cause severe damage to the
fetus causing the child to be born with various neurological and physical defects,
such as cerebral hemorrhaging, prenatal strokes, birth defects, neonatal growth
retardation and fine motor disorders. See Enid Logan, The Wrong Race, Committing
Crime, Doing Drugs, and Maladjusted for Motherhood: The Nation's Fury Over "Crack
Babies", Soc. JusT., Summer 1999, at 115 (stating that race, gender and class op-
pression influence drug use, thereby affecting phenomenon of "crack baby").
Early studies also indicated negative long-term effects on the child. Researchers
believed that crack babies grew up to be abnormal. They also found evidence that
something was missing from their brains, stating that, "in crack-babies, the part of
their brains that 'makes us human beings, capable of discussion or reflection' has
been 'wiped out."' Id. at 117 (quoting Katharine Greider, Crackpot Ideas, MOTHER
JONES, July/Aug. 1995, at 52, 53). On the other hand, more recent studies and
programs demonstrate that any developmental delays suffered by children at birth
can be overcome within several years and that "crack babies" can be normal chil-
dren and adults. See Lawrence M. Berger & Jane Waldfogel, Prenatal Cocaine Expo-
sure: Long-Run Effects and Policy Implications, 74 Soc. SE Rv. REV. 28, 30-31 (2000)
(noting that outcomes associated with prenatal exposure can be overcome
through competent caregiving in appropriate environment); Wendy Chavkin, Co-
caine and Pregnancy: Time to Look at the Evidence, 285JAMA 1626 (2001) (noting that
"the data are not persuasive that in utero exposure to cocaine has major adverse
developmental consequences..."); Meredith Cosden et al., Effects of Prenatal Drug
Exposure on Birth Outcomes and Early Child Development, 27J. DRUG ISSUES 525 (1997)
(stating that many infants exposed in utero have normal birth outcomes).
3. See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 27-40.
4. See id. at 38-39. Pro-choice advocates, however, are also concerned with the
effect of drugs on the unborn fetus and do offer other suggestions as to how soci-
ety might deal with the problem. In California, pro-choice advocates sponsored
legislation supporting educational services and drug treatment programs as a
means of reducing the number of children born addicted to drugs. For example,
California state representative, Jackie Speier, a pro-choice advocate, sponsored
four bills regarding drug exposure to the fetus, but none were of a punitive nature.
See id. at 38 (noting thatJackie Speier associated her pro-choice position with issue
of prenatal drug exposure).
[Vol. 47: p. 299
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Several states have tried to charge such women with either distribu-
tion of drugs to a minor,5 criminal child abuse 6 or homicide 7 based on the
use of illegal drugs before birth. Most courts have rejected such an ap-
proach, mainly on statutory grounds, reasoning that the word "child" or
"minor" means one that is born.8 The courts are also swayed by policy
considerations, finding that criminal prosecution is not an effective means
of dealing with pregnant women's drug abuse problems.9 South Carolina
5. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1295 (Fla. 1992) (finding that
law prohibiting distribution of illegal drugs to minor was not applicable to mother
who used illegal drugs during pregnancy).
6. See, e.g., Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 785-86 (S.C. 1997) (confirming
conviction of woman for criminal child abuse based on her drug use during preg-
nancy). But see, e.g., Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912, 914-15 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1977) (finding that child abuse endangerment statute did not apply to harm
inflicted onto fetus).
7. See, e.g., David Firestone, Woman Is Convicted of Killing Her Fetus by Smoking
Cocaine, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2001, at A12 (reporting that twenty-four year old wo-
man was sentenced to twelve years in prison for killing her unborn fetus by smok-
ing crack cocaine); Bob Herbert, Stillborn Justice, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2001, at A29
(same). A South Carolina woman was charged and convicted of the homicide of
her still born infant by her use of crack cocaine during pregnancy. See infra notes
229-32 and accompanying text.
8. See Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1291-92 (noting that child abuse statute only ap-
plies to abuse after child is born). In Johnson, the court found that a woman could
not be charged with delivering drugs to a minor when it was based on the mother's
drug use during pregnancy, as the legislature did not intend to include a fetus in
the definition of a child. Furthermore, appellate courts have overturned criminal
convictions because the mother's actions occurred during pregnancy, and the
courts did not consider a fetus a child. See Reyes, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 914-15 (holding
that child abuse statute does not reach abuse directed at unborn children); State v.
Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140, 114243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (same); State v. Luster,
419 S.E.2d 32, 34-35 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that statute penalizing delivering
and distribution of cocaine does not apply to delivery from mother to unborn
child); People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 53 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting argu-
ment that legislature intended pregnant woman's cocaine use to fall within type of
conduct prosecuted under delivery-of-cocaine statute); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d
710, 711-12 (Ohio 1992) (deciding that state may not prosecute parent for child
endangerment on basis of substance abuse that occurred before child's birth); see
also GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 149 n.15 (noting that several courts have thrown out
convictions based on prenatal drug exposure). But see Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 777
(holding that word "child" in statute includes viable fetus).
9. See Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1295-96 (stating that "prosecuting women for us-
ing drugs and 'delivering' them to their newborns appears to be the least effective
response to this crisis"). "Criminal penalties may exacerbate the harm done to
fetal health by deterring pregnant substance abusers from obtaining help or care
from either the health or public welfare professions . . . . Such prosecution is
counterproductive to the public interest .. " Id. at 1296. Some prosecutors have
begun to realize that social service agencies and public health organizations may
be better equipped to handle this problem. A prosecutor from San Diego, Califor-
nia believes criminalization could lead "these women to hide out-they wouldn't
seek treatment because they would be incriminating themselves." GoMEZ, supra
note 1, at 86. The same prosecutor also noted that social service and health agen-
cies had begun to develop successful treatment strategies:
You can go down to our county rehab center and they're-for lack of a
better word-celebrating addicted mothers who come in to get treatment
2002]
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is the notable exception to this judicial trend. In Whitner v. State,10 the
South Carolina Supreme Court held that a viable fetus is a child within the
meaning of the child abuse and endangerment law. The court affirmed
an eight-year prison term of a woman who smoked crack during the third
trimester, causing the baby to be born with cocaine metabolites in its sys-
tem. The court rejected the defendant's due process privacy claim and
"her right to carry her pregnancy to term."" The court noted that the
legislature had the right to "impose additional criminal penalties on preg-
nant women who engage in this already illegal conduct because of the
effect the conduct has on the viable fetus .... -12
South Carolina authorities, however, wanted more. They sought to
coerce crack addicted pregnant women into treatment by threatening and
actually imposing imprisonment if they did not enter and stay in a drug
abuse treatment program. 13 The charges brought against the women va-
and get off the narcotic. And they actually have these photographic dis-
plays of mothers and their children who they were carrying while they
were using substances, and now they're holding their child and saying,
"I'm clean, I'm not using." But it's that kind of a social approach to help
the person.
Id.
10. 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
11. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 785 (holding that "plain meaning of 'child' as used
in this [child abuse] statute includes a viable fetus"). The defendant cited multi-
ple cases to support her argument that prosecuting her "burden[ed] her right of
privacy, or, more specifically, her right to carry her pregnancy to term," including
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972) and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Id. The Whitner
court, however, focused on the LaFleur case. See id. at 785-86 (citing LaFleur ra-
tional to support holding that statute did not burden defendant's "right to carry
her pregnancy to term or any other privacy act"). In LaFleur, teachers were re-
quired to take maternity leave beginning at the fourth or fifth month of pregnancy
until the child was three months old. See LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 634-35 (stating facts
of case). The state, in LaFleur, argued that its interest was the continuity of pupil's
education, but the Court found that the policy was not a rationale means to meet
the state's objective. See Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 785 (discussing facts of LaFleur).
The Whitner court emphasized the state's interest in "protecting the life and health
of the viable fetus," citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), in support of this proposition. Id. at 785-86. Further-
more, the Whitner court stated that, unlike the circumstances of LaFleur, Whitner's
fundamental rights were not implicated by the prosecution. See id. at 786 (stating
that "we do not think any fundamental right of Whitner's ... is implicated under
the present scenario"). The Whitner court pointed out that no person, including
Whitner, has a right to use illegal drugs. See id. (noting that "[u]se of crack co-
caine is illegal, period").
12. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 786.
13. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1284-85 (2001) (dis-
cussing statute South Carolina enacted to deal with issue of pregnant women using
cocaine). Medical personnel at a publicly funded hospital in Charleston were con-
cerned about the increase of drug use by pregnant women. A nurse in the hospital
heard about a program by the Greenville police department to arrest and charge
drug abusing pregnant women with child abuse. The hospital's counsel contacted
Charleston's city attorney to offer the hospital's assistance in instituting a similar
program. See id. at 1284 (explaining facts of case).
[Vol. 47: p. 299
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ried from simple possession to child endangerment, depending on the
stage of pregnancy.' 4 In Ferguson v. City of Charleston,1 5 a six-to-three deci-
sion,' 6 the United States Supreme Court invalidated a policy in which a
state hospital transmitted positive drug test results of pregnant women to
the police for criminal prosecution if the women did not enroll in or re-
main in a substance abuse treatment program. 17 The urine test, which is a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 18 was performed if
a woman met one or more of nine criteria.' 9 These criteria, however, did
not establish a legally sufficient basis for a search under the Constitu-
tion.20 Thus, the drug screen was taken without a warrant, probable cause
or reasonable suspicion, and because of the procedural posture of the
case, the Court also assumed that there was no consent.
21
14. During pregnancy, if a woman tested positive at twenty-seven weeks or
less, the charge is "simple possession." Id. at 1285. Beyond twenty-seven weeks, the
charge is "possession and distribution to a person under the age of 18-in this
case, the fetus." Id. Finally, if the woman tested positive for drugs at delivery, the
charge is "unlawful neglect of a child." Id.
15. 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001).
16. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion, in which Justices O'Connor, Souter,
Ginsburg and Breyerjoined. See Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1284. Justice Kennedy con-
curred in the judgment. See id. at 1293. Justice Scalia dissented, joined in part by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. See id. at 1296.
17. See id. at 1285-93 (holding that South Carolina's statute dealing with pre-
natal cocaine violates women's Fourth Amendment rights). The women entered a
treatment program and were to abstain from using drugs. Although the policy
stated that the police would be notified only if the woman did not stay in the
program or tested positive a second time, in reality, when the program was first
instituted, women were being arrested after the first positive drug test. See id. (stat-
ing facts of case).
18. Urine tests are searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
even though such tests do not involve an intrusion into one's body. The reasoning
is that urine tests "can reveal a host of private medical facts about [an individual
and can] involve visual or aural monitoring of the act of urination, [which by]
itself implicates privacy interests." Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 617 (1989).
19. The criteria the medical personnel used at the hospital were as follows:
1. No prenatal care 2. Late prenatal care after 24 weeks gestation 3. In-
complete prenatal care 4. Abruptio placentae 5. Intrauterine fetal death
6. Preterm labor "of no obvious cause" 7. IUGR [intrauterine growth re-
tardation] "of no obvious cause" 8. Previously known drug or alcohol
abuse 9. Unexplained congenital anomalies.
Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1285 n.4.
20. See generally Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S., 213 (1983) (adopting "totality of the
circumstances" test to determine if probable cause exists for issuance of search
warrant).
21. See Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1287-88 (explaining that there was no probable
cause or "even the basis for a reasonable suspicion" of cocaine use). Certiorari was
granted to determine "whether the interest in using the threat of criminal sanc-
tions to deter pregnant women from using cocaine can justify a departure from the
general rule that an official nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if not author-
ized by a valid warrant." Id. at 1284. The United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of South Carolina determined that the taking of the urine and the subsequent
drug screen were unreasonable searches. See id. at 1286 (finding that searches
5
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Concerns relating to the health of the mother and fetus raised the
likelihood that the policy would fit neatly into the "special needs" excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause requirements,
as indeed the Fourth Circuit found.2 2 Under prior case law, if a program
had a governmental purpose independent of general law enforcement,
the case would fall into the special needs category, prompting the use of a
test balancing the independent governmental objective against the indi-
vidual's privacy right.23 Almost invariably, the result of the balancing
tilted in favor of the state, 24 leading many commentators to argue that the
special needs exception could theoretically swallow the Fourth Amend-
ment because behind every law enforcement need are some other non-
criminal safety or health concerns. 2
5
In a surprising constriction of the special needs line of cases, the Fer-
guson majority noted the "pervasive involvement" of the police and lack of
special medical treatment for drug abusing pregnant women and their fe-
tuses once they were identified.2 6 The Court interpreted the earlier spe-
cial needs decisions to make a critical distinction between the state's
were unreasonable because they were not conducted by medical university for
medical purposes). Regarding consent, however, the district court determined it
was a factual issue for the jury. See id. (asserting that jury should find for petition-
ers unless they found consent). The jury found consent, and the petitioners ap-
pealed. See id. (noting that petitioners appealed on theory that there was
insufficient evidence to support jury's finding). On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit did not reach the issue of consent, finding
that the "special needs" doctrine applied. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186
F.3d 469, 476 (1999) (stating that "we affirm on the basis that the searches were
reasonable as special needs searches"). The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to review whether the Fourth Circuit's determination, regarding the spe-
cial needs doctrine, was correct. See Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1287 (stating that "[w]e
granted certiorari to review the appellate court's holding on the 'special needs'
issue"). They remanded the consent issue. See id.
22. See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 476 (applying special needs doctrine to South
Carolina statute).
23. See generally Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (defining
and applying special needs exception to Fourth Amendment warrant and probable
cause requirements); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656
(1995) (discussing situations where search warrant is not required because com-
pelling government interest exists); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602 (1989) (same); see also
infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
24. But see Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322-23 (1997) (invalidating state
law requiring drug testing of individuals running for political office). Of course, if
the primary purpose is viewed as having a general criminal purpose, the special
needs doctrine cannot apply, and, therefore, the usual Fourth Amendment re-
quirement of probable cause is necessary. See Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S.
32, 48 (2000) (holding that city checkpoints, which have primary purpose of de-
tecting illegal drugs, were unconstitutional).
25. See, e.g., Andrea Lewis, Drug Testing: Can Privacy Interests Be Protected Under
The "Special Needs" Doctrine?, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 1013, 1044 (1990) (proposing that
special needs doctrine will make probable cause requirement irrelevant).
26. See Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1290-91 (explaining that "different courses of
medical treatment" were not available to mother or infant and that police "were
extensively involved in the day-to-day administration of the policy").
[Vol. 47: p. 299
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ultimate goal-in this case, to persuade pregnant women to enter a drug
abuse program-from its immediate objective of generating evidence for
criminal prosecution. After Ferguson, special needs were to be determined
by the immediate, rather than the ultimate, goal.
2 7
Since the taking of the urine sample was not forced-the women
"freely and voluntarily provided the urine samples" to the hospital 28-the
dissent argued that obtaining and transmitting it to the police did not
violate the Fourth Amendment, 29 and therefore, the special needs doc-
trine was inapposite. 30 Moreover, even assuming that the special needs
cases were implicated, Justice Scalia, dissenting, maintained that the case
at bar fell squarely within them.3 1 He further claimed that the majority's
decision cast doubt on the validity of various reporting statutes, including
those requiring medical personnel or other persons to advise the police of
27. See id. at 1293-94 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that immediate result
of search will now be the special need required to justify searches). Justice Ken-
nedy noted that in the previous special needs cases, the Court considered the ulti-
mate goal of the policy-"deterring drug use by our Nation's school children,"-
rather than the immediate goal-"gathering evidence of drug use by student ath-
letes." Id. at 1293. Although Ferguson indicates a change in the Court's view of
special needs, Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment. See id. at 1293-96 (ex-
pressing concern with majority's decision to focus on immediate purpose of search
as opposed to ultimate goal).
28. Id. at 1296 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that the Court had
previously found that it was not unconstitutional for the police to use information
obtained lawfully for other purposes by non-police personnel. See id. at 1297 (cit-
ing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1996)). "' [T]he Fourth Amendment
[does not protect] a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he volun-
tarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it."' Id. (citing Hoffa, 385 U.S. at
302). Therefore, Justice Scalia argued that because the urine was not taken forci-
bly, turning over the test results to the police was valid. See id. at 1298 (finding that
police did not engage in unconstitutional search because urine samples were given
consensually). He also argued that, even if there was coercion (which he did not
believe there was), it would be immaterial because the state was not involved in any
coercive activities. See id. at 1299 (noting that government did not coerce patients
into providing urine samples, and if coercion did exist, it was based on need for
medical treatment during pregnancy).
29. See id. (stating "that there is no basis for saying that obtaining of the urine
sample was unconstitutional"). On this issue, Justice Scalia dissented by himself.
See id. at 1296, 1299-1302. ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined him
only in the second part of his dissent regarding the special needs analysis. See id.
Justice Scalia argued that the majority incorrectly concluded that reporting tests to
the police was a search, and that instead, the search was merely the "taking of the
urine sample." Id. at 1296.
30. See id. at 1299 (noting that special needs doctrine is irrelevant because
taking of urine sample and passing it on to police was constitutional and doctrine
only applies to "searches and seizures that are otherwise unlawful").
31. See id. (explaining that special needs doctrine validates transmitting urine
sample to police).
7
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possible criminal behavior. 32 The majority, however, found that such re-
porting requirements were "simply not in issue."
33
The Ferguson decision is, in its own way, narrow. It does not prohibit
medical personnel from reporting substance abuse by pregnant women to
the police in all situations. The majority opinion relied heavily on the
facts and circumstances of the case. 34 A modified version of the Charles-
ton, South Carolina program, even one that could ultimately lead to im-
prisonment for crack addicted pregnant women, would probably pass
constitutional muster.3 5 Whether coercing pregnant women into treat-
ment by using the jail stick is good policy is another matter. There are
other responses to the problem of crack babies that in all likelihood re-
main unaffected by Ferguson and that might work better to protect
children.
In this Article, I discuss a range of legal options available to the state
to deal with this important problem. 36 These choices include-on a spec-
32. See id. at 1297-98, 1300-01 (stating that South Carolina statute is indistin-
guishable from other reporting statutes that require medical professionals and
others to report criminal behavior). Justice Scalia took the position that "estab-
lished law ... says that information obtained through violation of a relationship of
trust is obtained consensually, and is hence not a search." Id. at 1298. He went on
to say that the majority's position leaves undetermined the issue of when evidence
obtained by trusted sources can be used by the police, and therefore, requires that
such future determinations be made on a case-by-case basis. See id. (arguing that
majority's holding "leaves law enforcement officials entirely in the dark as to when
they can use incriminating evidence obtained from 'trusted' sources").
33. Id. at 1290. The majority is clear that no one is questioning the right and
the responsibility of medical personnel to report child abuse. Such statutes have
not been challenged by the Ferguson case. See id. (providing that majority's holding
does not affect child abuse statutes that require medical professionals to report
information that they came across "in the course of ordinary medical procedures
aimed at helping the patient herself"). Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opin-
ion, agreed with the majority and stated that the decision did "not call into ques-
tion the validity of mandatory reporting laws such as child abuse laws .... even if
arrest and prosecution is the likely result." Id. at 1295 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
34. See infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
35. According to the majority, the case does "not address ... doctors indepen-
dently compl[ying] with reporting requirements." Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1292. Jus-
tice Kennedy stated "South Carolina can impose punishment upon an expectant
mother who has so little regard for her own unborn that she risks causing him or
her lifelong damage and suffering." Id. at 1295 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Be-
cause Justice Scalia believed that there was no search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment and would have upheld the right of Charleston's officials to
institute and carry out such a program, he would likely uphold any similar type
program. See id. at 1302 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding that "there was no uncon-
tested search in this case"). ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustice Thomas concurred
with Justice Scalia's opinion that even if it were a search and there was no consent,
then the special needs doctrine applied and the program was constitutional. See id.
at 1299 (explaining that if "properly applied," the special needs doctrine would
"validate" the South Carolina statute).
36. In addition to these legal options, society could offer other solutions to
this problem. If the government (state and federal) were willing to put more re-
sources into fighting the problem of crack addicted pregnant women, additional
306
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trum from the most to the least intrusive on individual liberty-criminal
incarceration, civil commitment, termination of parental rights and tem-
porary removal of the child after birth, along with any other children the
woman may have. I do not necessarily agree with all these alternatives or
the means of implementing them. In particular, I find the use of criminal
and civil incarceration not only an unnecessary infringement on women's
personal liberty, but also as working at irrational cross-purposes with the
objective of protecting the fetus.3 7 Nor can one ignore the reality that
such laws fall disproportionally on poor minority women.38
In addition, although I favor temporary removal and permanent ter-
mination as a better means of dealing with the crack addicted pregnant
woman, I do not view these avenues as perfect solutions. There are draw-
backs to using them, particularly if done in a knee jerk fashion without
looking to the facts and circumstances of each case. That is, not every
crack addicted pregnant woman should lose her children, either tempora-
rily or permanently. Furthermore, the solutions, if any, greatly depend on
the state's willingness to provide sufficient resources to help addicted
pregnant women. 39
II. CRIMINAL INCARCERATION AND CIVIL COMMITMENT ALTERNATIVES
AFER FERGUSON
Although pregnant women can be charged with possession, use or
distribution of illegal drugs, district attorneys vary in the ways they use the
criminal law to inflict punishment on the pregnant woman because her
behavior may cause harm to the fetus. A noted expert, Professor Laura
Gomez, identified four categories of prosecutorial responses to the prob-
lem of pregnant addicts, ranging from very punitive to inaction.40 Exam-
ples of cases in the "very punitive" category include the homicide
educational efforts and treatment programs could be offered. These types of com-
prehensive specially designed programs have had more success than incarceration,
but are more costly. See infra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 101-17 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 138-63 and accompanying text; see also Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 473 (4th Cir. 1999) (claiming that Charleston policy to
drug test pregnant women had racially disparate impact in violation of Title VI
regulations, which prohibits discrimination in federally assisted programs).
39. The unwillingness of government to put resources into solving this prob-
lem is a major hurdle that needs to be overcome. In California, the legislature
passed almost thirty bills between 1983 and 1996 regarding addicted pregnant wo-
men. None of these bills was punitive in nature, but a large number of the bills
were vetoed by the governor because of the high price tags attached to the legisla-
tion. See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 41 (noting that California's Governor vetoed
almost fifteen percent of legislative bills concerning pregnant women's drug use
from 1983 to 1996); see also infra notes 226-28 and accompanying text.
40. See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 78 (listing four prosecutorial responses to
problem of pregnant drug users). Professor Gomez divides the prosecutorial re-
sponses to the problem of pregnant addicts into four categories: "(1) very puni-
tive-prosecution with the intent to punish; (2) moderately punitive ('hard'
diversion)-prosecution under existing statutes to coerce women into treatment;
9
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prosecution of a South Carolina woman for the death of her fetus due to
her smoking crack cocaine, 4 1 and the trial of a Florida woman for the
delivery of a controlled substance to her child at birth. 42 The emphasis in
this class is on punishment and incarceration of the woman for her harm
to the fetus.
Professor Gomez considered the Charleston, South Carolina program
at issue in Ferguson as only "moderately punitive," because the intent is not
to punish, but rather merely to coerce women to enter drug treatment
programs by threatening prosecution. 43 She argued that this approach
focuses on treatment, rather than punishment and incarceration. But, of
course, if the treatment is rejected, the end result will be the same as cases
in the "very punitive" category-imprisonment because of danger to the
fetus.
Although the Court found this specific program unconstitutional,
there may be ways to design similar programs that permit incarceration for
refusal of treatment that would be constitutionally sound. In other words,
Ferguson does not remove all possibility of criminal prosecution and incar-
ceration of pregnant addicted women to protect their fetuses. 44 While
(3) least punitive ('soft' diversion)-threatening prosecution to encourage women
to enroll in treatment; and (4) inaction." Id.
41. See Firestone, supra note 7, at A12 (stating that South Carolina sentenced
woman to twelve years in prison for killing her unborn fetus by ingesting crack
cocaine); Herbert, supra note 7, at A29 (same). Professor Gomez does not men-
tion this case in her book as it was decided after the book was written. It is, how-
ever, an obvious example of the "very punitive" category.
42. See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 78-79 (providing Florida prosecution of wo-
man for delivery of controlled substance to her son and daughter as example of
"very punitive" response to problem of drug use by pregnant women). Although
both of the Florida woman's children were born healthy, they tested positive for
drugs at birth. See id. at 78 (explaining that son and daughter "were born healthy,
but each tested positive at birth for the cocaine metabolite").
43. See id. at 79-81 (noting that South Carolina statute encouraged drug treat-
ment for pregnant women by threatening prosecution). The "least punitive"
model differs from the "moderately punitive" model because pregnant addicted
women who are arrested for non-violent offenses are able to avoid prosecution by
attending a drug treatment program. See id. at 81 (discussing "least punitive" pro-
grams, which allow women to "avoid prosecution by participating in a coordinated
prenatal care/drug treatment"). The difference between these two models is that
the moderately punitive model is viewed as coercive, while the least punitive model
is viewed as diversionary. See id. at 82 (stating that moderately punitive programs
coerce women into drug treatment while least punitive models divert women from
the criminal justice system into treatment programs). Under the "very punitive"
model, the woman is prosecuted, and if this results in a conviction, the woman will
be incarcerated. Where prosecutors follow the fourth model, "inaction," they do
nothing, leaving the solution of this problem to the child protective agencies. See
id. (noting that "prosecutors may choose not to single out these [prenatal drug
use] cases in any way").
44. Justice Stevens notes that hospital personnel may have the duty to report
"evidence of criminal conduct that they inadvertently acquire in the course of rou-
tine treatment." Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1292 (2001). Jus-
tice Kennedy argues that states can prosecute crack addicted pregnant women for
the harm they do to their fetus. See id. at 1295 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating
[Vol. 47: p. 299
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Ferguson clearly limits the powers of the state in this context, it leaves more
than sufficient penal options in dealing with the problem. Furthermore,
Ferguson does not speak at all to the use of civil commitment as an alterna-
tive method. Afortiori, if criminal prosecution remains an available option
after Ferguson, then surely civil commitment does as well. I will discuss
these two alternatives in the proceeding two sections.
A. Criminal Prosecution
Prior to Ferguson, the Court rendered four urine drug testing deci-
sions that could have applied to the case at bar. In each case, the Court
found that because the testing invaded a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, 45 it was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.46 In
these cases, the government asserted that there were special needs inde-
pendent of ordinary law enforcement objectives that justified departure
from Fourth Amendment requirements. The Court then determined if,
in fact, special needs were involved. If the answer was yes, the Court en-
gaged in a constitutional balancing designed to determine if a warrant or
individualized suspicion was necessary. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Execu-
tives' Ass'n, 4 7 against a backdrop of frequent drug use by railway employ-
ees, the Court approved mandatory drug testing of those who either were
involved in major accidents or who violated safety rules. The special need
asserted was to protect the safety and lives of railroad passengers. In Na-
tional Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,48 the Court upheld warrantless,
suspicionless testing of United States Custom Service employees who were
being promoted to positions allowing them to carry weapons or to execute
drug interdiction efforts. This was also permissible because of the need to
protect "the integrity of our Nation's borders or the life of the citizenry."4 9
Vernonia School District v. Acton 5° validated warrantless random drug testing
of public school students involved in intramural sports because of the
school's "custodial and tutelary responsibility for children," 51 and because
that "South Carolina can impose punishment upon an expectant mother who has
so little regard for her own unborn that she risks causing his or her lifelong dam-
age and suffering" by ingesting cocaine during her pregnancy). Justice Scalia be-
lieves that the decision of whether the police can act in this type of situation
should be left to "the democratic process-which would produce a decision by the
citizens of Charleston, through their elected representatives." Id. at 1296 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
45. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-62 (1967) (discussing reasona-
ble expectations of privacy standard).
46. See Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1287 .(citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989)).
47. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
48. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
49. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679. Justice Scalia, however, dissented because
"neither frequency of use nor connection to harm is demonstrated or even likely."
Id. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
51. Veronia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 656.
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of the need to protect young athletes from injuries and to provide positive
role models for the entire student body which "was in a state of rebel-
lion." 2 In Chandler v. Miller,53 however, a state law requiring drug testing
of those running for high political office was invalidated because the ma-
jority found that there was no evidence that state office holders had drug
problems, and therefore, the Court regarded the state's interest as "sym-
bolic" rather than "special."5 4 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the
state's interest was not substantial enough to outweigh the individual's pri-
vacy interest.
The majority in Ferguson distinguished these cases on the ground that
the special needs the state asserted as justification in such cases were "di-
vorced from the State's general interest in law enforcement. '55 In Fergu-
son, on the other hand, the police were involved in the program from its
inception and on a day-to-day basis. The drug tests were used specifically
to obtain incriminating evidence of criminal wrongdoing so that if a pa-
tient refused treatment, she could be successfully prosecuted and incarcer-
ated. 56 To achieve that end, police officials themselves determined the
52. Id. at 663.
53. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
54. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318, 322; see also Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 681 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that testing was illegal because it was performed merely for
symbolic reasons). Justice Scalia, however,joined the majority opinion in Chandler.
See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 307 (indicating that Justice Scalia joined majority
opinion).
55. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1289 (2001). The Court
emphasized other ways in which the prior cases differed from Ferguson. For exam-
ple, the Court noted that because it was clear in the prior cases how the test results
would be used, "protections against the dissemination of the results to third par-
ties" existed. Id. at 1288. The Court reasoned that in the prior cases, the results
were used in less invasive ways-i.e., to prevent promotion or participation in
sports-and therefore implicated lower expectations of privacy. See id. (noting
that "the invasion of privacy in this case is far more substantial" than that seen in
prior cases). Furthermore, the Court stated "the gravity of the threat alone cannot
be dispositive of questions concerning what means law enforcement officers may
employ to pursue a given purpose." Id. at 1293 (quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond,
531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000)).
56. The Ferguson Court was most troubled by the fact that medical personnel
had the "specific purpose of incriminating.., patients," without assuring that the
patients were informed of their constitutional rights. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1292.
The Court cited, as an analogous proposition to the situation in Ferguson, Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), which was a Fifth Amendment case that required
warnings during custodial interrogations as a condition of admissibility of any
statement by the suspect. Such a scenario, however, was not presented by Ferguson.
See id. at 1297 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that Miranda is not analogous to facts
of Ferguson). The Miranda reference was also puzzling in light of Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) and United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976),
cases in which the Court ruled that suspects, even when in custody, do not have to
be advised of their Fourth Amendment rights in order to give a valid waiver. Thus,
although Miranda requires a knowing Fifth Amendment waiver, Fourth Amend-
ment waivers only have to be voluntary. In addition, as Justice Scalia noted, the
misplaced trust doctrine permits statements to be used in evidence even if they
were given to a private person or a public official under the mistaken belief that
[Vol. 47: p. 299
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procedures to use in performing the drug screening, advised personnel
how to assure a proper chain of custody for the urine samples, had access
to the women's files, attended meetings of the substance abuse team and
received reports of the women's progress while they were in treatment.
The Court found this quite different from situations in which physicians
"in the course of ordinary medical procedures aimed at helping the pa-
tient herself, come across information that under rules of law or ethics is
subject to reporting requirements, which no one has challenged here."5 7
The Court also distinguished Griffin v. Wisconsin58 and New York v.
Burger,59 other special needs cases, albeit not involving urine testing. Grif-
fin allowed probation officers to search a probationer's home without a
warrant or probable cause, reasoning that such requirements would inter-
fere with the state's operation of a probation system. 60 The Ferguson Court
concluded that Griffin was not controlling because, unlike women receiv-
ing medical treatment, probationers have lesser expectations of privacy,
and because the Giffin Court had reserved decision on whether routine use
of such evidence for criminal prosecution would be valid. 61 Similarly, in
Burger, the Court upheld a program that permitted police officers to carry
out warrantless administrative inspections of companies involved in dis-
mantling cars because owners in such highly regulated businesses had lit-
tle expectation of privacy. 62 Furthermore, "the discovery of evidence of
other [penal law] violations [was deemed to be] merely incidental to the
purposes of the administrative search." 63
Justice Kennedy concurred only in the Ferguson judgment, arguing
that the majority's distinction between the "ultimate goal and immediate
purpose" of the policy was not supported by precedent.64 In his view, all
of the special needs cases depended on the policy's ultimate goal. In every
such case, he argued, the immediate purpose of the search was to collect
evidence. He noted, "[A]lthough procuring evidence is the immediate
the information would be kept secret. See id. (stating "that using lawfully (but de-
ceivingly) obtained materials for purposes other than those represented, and giv-
ing that material or information derived from it to the police, is
unconstitutional"). In one case, the Court held that a confession obtained by a
government agent posing as an inmate was admissible even without Miranda warn-
ings. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 294 (1990) (holding that "Miranda warn-
ings are not required when the suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a law
enforcement officer and gives a voluntary statement").
57. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1290.
58. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
59. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
60. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 878 (stating that "the probation regime would ...
be unduly disrupted by a requirement of probable cause").
61. See Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1289 n.15 (distinguishing Griffin from facts
presented by Ferguson).
62. See id. at 1291 n.21 (noting that Burgerinvolved expectation of privacy that
was "particularly attenuated").
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1293 (KennedyJ., concurring).
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result of a successful search, until today that procurement has not been
identified as the special need which justifies the search."65 By contrast, he
found the South Carolina program unconstitutional because the test re-
suits were specifically intended for criminal prosecution. The hospital be-
came, in effect, an arm of the police. 66
Justice Kennedy affirmed the power of the state to "impose punish-
ment" on expectant mothers who use drugs.67 He made it clear that the
ruling did not affect the validity of child abuse reporting statutes even
though the result of such reporting is likely to be criminal prosecution. 68
Justice Kennedy opined that medical personnel could establish criteria for
identifying drug-abusing women and provide counseling to them and
medical treatment to protect the fetus. The police could then "adopt le-
gitimate procedures" to obtain such evidence and use it to prosecute if
necessary. 69 Justice Scalia in dissent argued, however, that there was no
basis for distinguishing Ferguson from cases in which medical personnel
give the police incriminating evidence discovered during treatment. 70
The Ferguson Court left open two primary means of pursuing criminal
prosecution. The first being notification of the police pursuant to report-
ing statutes, and the second being consent of pregnant addicted women to
a urine analysis. Both possibilities are explored in the proceeding two
subsections.
1. Reporting Statutes
As the Ferguson majority observed, every state has a statute requiring
medical personnel to report child abuse.7 1 Most states, however, interpret
65. Id. at 1294 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
66. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding program unconstitutional be-
cause "there was substantial law enforcement involvement in the policy from its
inception").
67. Id. at 1295 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy, nonetheless,
noted it would be appropriate for the state to provide treatment to addicted preg-
nant women. See id. (noting that such rehabilitation and training is proper within
state's powers and obligations).
68. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that such reporting will likely
result in arrest and prosecution of mother).
69. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
70. See id. at 1300 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (questioning whether "addition of a
law-enforcement-related program to a legitimate medical purpose destroys applica-
bility of the 'special needs' doctrine") (emphasis in original).
71. See id. at 1290 (noting that such statutes are consistent with ethical report-
ing requirements). Many states also require school personnel, social workers and
law enforcement officials to report child abuse. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-
507(b) (Michie 1999) (listing as mandatory reporters medical personnel, teachers,
school officials, school counselors, social workers, family service workers, day care
center workers or any other child or foster care workers, mental health profession-
als, peace officers, law enforcement officials, prosecuting attorneys orjudges). In
some states, mandatory reporters include ordinary citizens witnessing abuse. See,
e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.201 (1) (West 2000) (stating all persons are mandatory
reporters if they know or have reasonable basis to suspect child abuse).
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their general civil child abuse laws to include only a child already born. 72
Simply amending the reporting and civil child abuse statutes to include
viable fetuses could obviate this problem. 73 This would make a pregnant
woman's conduct a basis both for reporting and coercing the woman into
treatment by the threat of removal of the child and possible termination
of parental rights.7 4 Moreover, given the language in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey7 5 that provides that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting
the life of the fetus from the onset of pregnancy, 76 a respectable argument
72. See In reValerie D., 613 A.2d 748, 770 (Conn. 1992) (finding statutes that
allow termination of parental rights cannot be based on mother's prenatal con-
duct); In reJ.B.C., 18 P.3d 342, 345 (Okla. 2001) (stating that child cannot be
declared dependent based on evidence of mother's conduct prior to birth of child
because fetus is not child within meaning of Oklahoma Children's Code). There
appear to be no reported cases interpreting mandatory reporting laws as including
only children already born. If a state court has interpreted ajurisdiction's general
child abuse statutes as applying to only live born children, however, presumably
the same would follow for mandatory reporting laws.
73. For example, Alabama's reporting statute does not currently include a
fetus. Alabama's statute reads as follows:
(a) All hospitals, clinics, sanitariums, doctors, physicians, surgeons .... or
any other person called upon to render aid or medical assistance to any
child, when the child is known or suspected to be a victim of child abuse
or neglect, shall be required to report, or cause a report to be made of
the same, orally.... immediately, followed by a written report, to a duly
constituted authority.
(b) When an initial report is made to a law enforcement official, the offi-
cial subsequently shall inform the Department of Human Resources of
the report so that the department can carry out its responsibility to pro-
vide protective services when deemed appropriate to the respective child
or children.
ALA. CODE § 26-14-3 (2000). The statute could be changed to read as follows,
which would allow for the reporting of the mother's drug use while pregnant:
(a) All hospitals, clinics, sanitariums, doctors, physicians, surgeons .... or
any other person called upon to render aid or medical assistance to any
child, fetus or pregnant woman, when the child or the fetus is known or sus-
pected to be a victim of child abuse or neglect, which includes the use of
illegal drugs by a pregnant woman, shall be required to report, or cause a
report to be made of the same, orally, . . . immediately, followed by a
written report, to a duly constituted authority.
(b) When an initial report is made to a law enforcement official, the offi-
cial subsequently shall inform the Department of Human Resources of
the report so that the department can carry out its responsibility to pro-
vide protective services when deemed appropriate to the respective child,
children orfetus. Protection of the fetus can include providing a drug treatment
program for the pregnant woman and parenting education for the prospective
parents.
74. Of course, there is no requirement that both statutes have to operate in
tandem. Thus, a state could opt for including fetuses in the reporting statute, but
not in the rest of the child abuse statutes.
75. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
76. See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 869 (noting that state's interest coexists
with protection of health of woman).
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could be made that state reporting laws could also cover non-viable
fetuses.
77
One could also take the position that if a woman can abort her fetus
prior to viability, why should she be punished because her drug use may
cause damage or death to the fetus? 78 It is a greater power includes a
lesser power analysis. That contention is usually deflected because the
mother is already committing a criminal act by using crack, and by the
crass view of some that abortion at least alleviates society of the cost of
caring for the unwanted child, whereas crack babies cost society a lot of
money. Nonetheless, abortion rights advocates see the current trend of
imprisoning addicted pregnant women to force cessation of drug use as a
way of undermining women's privacy right. They raise the slippery slope
argument of first crack, then liquor, then smoking and then not eating
nutritiously. 79 Whatever the merits of the privacy concerns, however, it is
unlikely that the Court would invalidate statutes designed to protect fe-
tuses that merely required medical personnel to report drug abuse by ad-
dicted pregnant women, even to the police.80 As long as the primary
purpose of the test is treatment rather than prosecution, Ferguson would
appear inapplicable.8 1
77. For an example of ambiguity in state reporting laws regarding the require-
ment of a viable fetus, see supra note 73 and accompanying text. Policy considera-
tions would dictate how inclusive the term fetus should be.
78. See Pat Swift, Author Argues That Fetal Rights Are Fundamental Attack on Wo-
men, BUFF. NEWS, Nov. 4, 2000, at D1. ("[W]ell-meaning efforts to protect a fetus
from being harmed by a mother's drug or alcohol abuse have been twisted into
laws that police and punish women and deny them essential control of their
bodies").
79. See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 38. Professor Gomez quotes a lobbyist for the
March of Dimes as an example of this type of reasoning:
[T]hat we allowed society to start marginalizing women's behaviors into
good behaviors/bad behaviors, that we'd go down a slippery slope ....
You know, if you could do this to substance abusing women jail them,
punish them], then you could do it to women who don't comply with
their diet for diabetes .... [You could start taking this out to some very
scary places.
Id.
80. Charleston and the Medical University of South Carolina stopped their
policy of reporting crack addicted pregnant women to the police after the lawsuit
was filed in 1993. Doctors who find themselves treating cocaine addicted pregnant
women now report them to "social service agencies, not police." Charles Lane,
Court Hears Drug-Test Arguments, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2000, at A10.
81. The Court did not address the validity of any proposed reporting statutes.
The Court only commented on existing child abuse reporting laws and the ethical
and legal responsibility the medical profession has to report criminal acts. The
Ferguson majority and Justice Kennedy stated that the Ferguson decision did not
change existing statutes, which would remain constitutional. See Ferguson v. City
of Charleston, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1291, 1295 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (ex-
plaining that South Carolina can still impose punishment on mother who has no
regard for her unborn child). Justice Scalia's argument to the contrary, whether
conceptually accurate or not, is irrelevant, as the majority and Justice Kennedy
stated explicitly that the reporting laws were not at issue in Ferguson. See id. at 1298
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Bypassing the policy hurdle of whether forcing medical personnel to
provide information to the police is efficacious in stopping the abusive
behavior of addicted pregnant women and protecting children in the long
term, 82 the question is whether information obtained as a result of such
expanded mandatory reporting statutes can be used for criminal prosecu-
tion of the pregnant woman? With respect to current reporting statutes,
the answers are varied. In some states, such evidence is inadmissible on
the ground that the information was privileged and could only be used for
purposes of civil proceedings to protect the child.83 Furthermore, if the
mandatory reporters who obtained the incriminating evidence from the
wrongdoers work for the state, jurisdictions that recognize the privileged
status of such communications hold that this information cannot be used
in a criminal trial unless the abusers have been given the warnings man-
dated by Miranda v. Arizona.84
In other states, information obtained by mandatory reporting profes-
sionals is admissible in a criminal case. For example, a doctor who pro-
vided prenatal care to a crack addicted pregnant woman would be able to
testify as to the woman's use of drugs. The doctor could also discuss the
possible or actual harm to the fetus or child in the pregnant woman's
criminal trial for child abuse. 85
The third response of the states is, it depends. In some jurisdictions,
there are statutes that govern who has access to the confidential informa-
tion provided by mandatory reporters. 86 Courts decide that question,
which in turn determines whether the confidential information could be
used in a criminal trial. Therefore, for example, district attorneys in those
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that by not addressing reporting laws, officials are
left without guidance).
82. Therapists and social workers have long complained about these report-
ing laws, arguing that their statutory obligation makes it difficult, if not impossible,
to treat wrongdoers. This has surfaced mainly with respect to sex offenders, but is
also applicable to drug abusers.
83. Cf Daymude v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1263, 1265-66 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that defendant's counselor, who was mandatory reporter, was not permit-
ted to testify in criminal proceeding about defendant's sex abuse of child because
purpose of the statute-protection of children-had been fulfilled).
84. 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see Cates v. State, 776 S.W.2d 170, 174 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1989) (holding that statements made by defendant to Department of Human
Resources' investigator are inadmissible if Miranda warnings are not given because
investigator is responsible for investigating child abuse allegations).
85. Cf State v. Tucker, 861 P.2d 37, 47 (Haw. 1993) (citing Hawaii Rule of
Evidence 701) (concluding that doctor's and social worker's testimony regarding
mother's lack of remorse when she found out her child died was permissible at the
mother's trial for murder of her infant son). Similarly, an obstetrician or pediatri-
cian may come to a rational conclusion that a mother's drug use has been harmful
to the fetus. For example, the mother may not keep her prenatal appointments,
may not be eating properly or the child may be born with visible indications of
drug addiction, such as tremors.
86. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE 11167.5 (West 2000) (listing agencies and per-
sons that have access to child abuse reports).
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states must petition the juvenile court that has jurisdiction over the matter
for access to the reports. In resolving that question, the courts use a total-
ity of the circumstances test in determining whether access and admissibil-
ity at the criminal trial should be granted.8 7  Assuming the
constitutionality of expanded mandatory reporting statutes which would
include the fetus, the states may decide, as a matter of policy, whether to
allow such information to be used in a criminal prosecution of the ad-
dicted pregnant woman. Thus, even after Ferguson, a state may still be able
to impose criminal punishment on women who endanger their fetuses by
using illegal drugs.
2. Consent
Aside from mandatory reporting statutes, there may be other ways to
circumvent Ferguson even in a criminal law context. First, in a Ferguson-type
program, if the women consented to the drug screen, as many of them
would because they are either in denial, under the influence of drugs,
unable fully to appreciate the consequences of their behavior or facing
some other pressure-for example, the need for treatment-they would
waive Fourth Amendment protection. 88 Furthermore, Schneckloth v. Bus-
tamonte89 and Watson v. United States" do not require that suspects, even
those in custody, be told that they can refuse to consent in order for the
waiver to be valid. The Ferguson Court's reference to Miranda, however,
might presage the need for some kind of cautionary notice in this
situation.9 1
If a woman refused to consent to a drug screen, that together with
other particularized indicia of drug use, might be sufficient to establish
probable cause or reasonable suspicion. In other contexts, the Court has
indicated that while refusal to consent to a search is not "by itself" suffi-
cient to establish probable cause,9 2 such refusal coupled with other factors
87. See 66 Op. Att'y Gen. 106 (1983).
88. Justice Scalia concludes that the women did consent to the taking of the
urine samples as it was not done forcibly-the women signed a consent for the
urine testing-and there is no legal precedent requiring that the women know the
test results would be turned over to the police. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
121 S. Ct. 1281, 1296-98 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice Scalia con-
cludes that the women were not coerced to give the sample in order to receive
medical treatment, but even if they were, it was not coercion applied by the gov-
ernment, and therefore, would be permissible. See id. at 1299 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). The majority, on the other hand, only discussed the application of the
special needs doctrine and did not reach the question of consent. Regarding con-
sent, the majority remanded the case for a determination by the lower court, See
id. at 1287.
89. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
90. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
91. For a further discussion, see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
92. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (holding that random con-
sensual bus searches are constitutional).
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might be.93 Medical authorities could then transmit such information to
the police. The information could in turn serve as a basis for securing a
warrant to test the mother for drugs.94
Even without factoring in refusal to consent, it may be possible to
design medical criteria that could establish a "fair probability"95 that the
woman used drugs. Although the South Carolina hospital did use criteria
to identify drug abusing pregnant women, 96 many of the criteria were not
specific and could result from factors other than drug use. For example,
the first criterion was the lack of prenatal care. 9 7 That could well result
from poverty, ignorance and fear. What is important under Ferguson is
keeping police out of the initial loop and obtaining the drug screen for
treatment rather than evidentiary purposes. In other words, criminal pros-
ecution should be an afterthought on the part of the doctor, a last
resort. 98
93. Cf Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 366 n.4 (1983) (Brennan, J., con-
curring) ("In some circumstances it is even conceivable that the mere fact that a
suspect refuses to answer questions once detained, viewed in the context of the
facts that gave rise to reasonable suspicion in the first place, would be enough to
provide probable cause. A court confronted with such a claim, however, would
have to evaluate it carefully to make certain that the person arrested was not being
penalized for the exercise of his right to refuse to answer.").
94. Is a warrant, however, even necessary? In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966), the warrant requirement was waived because of the need to act quickly
to obtain evidence of intoxication, and the Court upheld the warrantless extrac-
tion of blood from a driver who objected to the test. The Court also stressed that
the blood extraction was performed by a doctor at the direction of the police and
constituted a reasonable test "performed in a reasonable manner." Id. at 771. In
Veronia School District v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), a special needs case, the Court
upheld mandatory random urine tests for student athletes, in part, because the
taking of a urine sample was viewed as no more of an invasion of privacy than
using a public restroom or giving urine samples during a physical exam. See id. at
657 (quoting T.L.O. v. New Jersey, 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985)) (noting that "'stu-
dents within the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than
members of population generally"').
95. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
96. For a further discussion of the criteria used by the hospital, see supra note
19 and accompanying text.
97. For a further discussion of the criteria for medical personnel at the hospi-
tal, see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
98. Even assuming the evidence obtained by the doctors did violate the
Fourth Amendment, would that necessarily require exclusion of the tainted infor-
mation? The Ferguson Court did not reach the issue of the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule. The case did not arise on appeal of the women's convictions.
The action was brought in federal court against the city, law enforcement officials
and representatives of the hospital. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 121 S. Ct.
1281, 1281 (2001) (noting appeal arises from policy hospital established with po-
lice, which was an alleged violation of women's Fourth Amendment). The claim
argued Fourth Amendment violations and a disparate racial impact under Title VI,
which bars racial discrimination in federally assisted programs. See id.
While the Court has found that the Fourth Amendment applies to a variety of
non-police officials, such as teachers, T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 325, fire fighters, Michigan
v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984), and health inspectors, Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523 (1967), it has declined to make the exclusionary rule coterminous
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3. The Downside of Incarcerating Pregnant Drug Addicts
In my view, these criminal prosecutions that steer clear of Ferguson,
although probably constitutional, are neither efficacious nor humane.
Giving birth in jail is one of the most shattering experiences for a wo-
man. 9 9 She is manacled to the bed, without birthing partners, and the
child is immediately removed. 10 0 She and the child, therefore, cannot
bond properly, and this results in many children having what are called
"attachment disorders,"'' with serious implications for the child's future
emotional development. 10 2 Additionally, many crack babies enter foster
care, which does not always provide a stable nurturing environment.'
0 3
with the substantive coverage of the Bill of Rights guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Indeed, the Court has held that judicial clerks, Arizona v.
Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995), legislators, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), and
judges, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), are not covered by the exclusion-
ary rule, on the theory that such officials would not be deterred by its use. Presum-
ably, the same would be true for doctors and other medical personnel. The risk
remains that if there is a Fourth Amendment violation, women may be able to sue
for damages.
99. In 1993, a class action suit was brought by women prisoners against the
District of Columbia correctional system. See Women Prisoners v. District of Co-
lumbia, 877 F. Supp. 634, 638-39 (D.D.C. 1994) (seeking injunctive relief from
sexual harassment, violation of Title IX and for inadequate obstetrical and gyneco-
logical care). The women sued for injunctive relief to improve conditions in the
D.C. correctional facilities. In addition to the women not receiving proper prena-
tal care, the case illustrates the problems women face when they are pregnant and
in prison. One woman whose contractions were five minutes apart was shackled
and sent to a prescheduled court hearing. See id. at 646. She was returned to the
facility because she could not walk due to the labor pains and was offered aspirin
and told to "prop her feet up and rub her stomach." Id. She delivered her baby
shortly after in her cell, and then was shackled and sent to the hospital. See id.
Handcuffs and shackles are not unusual for women in jail. "A physician's assistant
stated that even when a woman is in labor 'their ankles and their hands are cuf-
fed."' Id.
100. Cf id. at 646-47 (discussing shackling of inmates during labor and post-
partum treatment of female inmates and their children).
101. Attachment disorders occur when an infant does not have the opportu-
nity to bond with a nurturing caregiver who attends to the infant's needs. A con-
stant caregiver gives an infant a secure base from which to explore his or her
surroundings. Without appropriate attachment development, a child will have dif-
ficulty forming normal relationships and is likely to have impaired social develop-
ment. See Samantha L. Wilson, Attachment Disorders: Review and Current Status, 135J.
PSYCHOL. 37, 3749 (2001) (reviewing literature and studies available on attach-
ment disorders).
102. See id. at 49 (noting potential perils of attachment disorders). Mothers
are also impacted by the separation from their children. This can cause severe
post-partum depression. In the D.C. correctional facilities, women were given min-
imal visiting time with their babies and were not given proper counseling to ar-
range for alternative care. See Women Prisoners, 877 F. Supp. at 647 (stating
practices of D.C. Department of Corrections). Experts testified that mothers need
to hold their children often, at least for every feeding time. See id.
103. Recent studies have indicated that "crack babies" who are brought up in
nurturing environments, with consistent, caring caretakers, can catch up develop-
mentally with children who are born drug-free. See Logan, supra note 2, at 121.
318 [Vol. 47: p. 299
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Furthermore, the use of jail for drug abusing expectant mothers be-
yond the first trimester may not necessarily help the fetus. The medical
evidence indicates that drug abuse, similar to alcohol abuse, does the most
damage in the first trimester, 10 4 and that many women who are drug abus-
ers do not get prenatal care for many reasons, including not knowing they
are pregnant. 10 5 This is not to say that damage or even death can not
occur in the later stages of pregnancy or in the birthing process, for it can
and does. 10 6 The odds are, however, that drug use in the first trimester is
the most important in terms of protecting the child from developmental
and neurological harm.
Criminal prosecution also does not provide lasting benefits for the
mother. Unless she receives treatment in jail, which she has to be willing
to accept, and many are not, she will be back on drugs as soon as she is
released. While it is true that she cannot use drugs while in jail, 10 7 there
will be nothing to prevent her from becoming pregnant again upon her
release and renewing her drug use, this time with knowledge that going to
a doctor for prenatal care is dangerous to her liberty. 10 8
Moreover, the reality is that many states do not provide quality drug
treatment programs for pregnant women, either in jail or on the
Therefore, it becomes even more important for these children to avoid being
caught up in the foster care shuffle.
104. See Gale A. Richardson & Nancy L. Day, Studies of Prenatal Cocaine Expo-
sure: Assessing the Influence of Extraneous Variables, 29 J. DRUG ISSUEs 225, 232 (1999)
(noting tendency of births of underweight babies from mothers that used cocaine
during first trimester). It is difficult to determine the actual effect of crack cocaine
on the fetus as compared to the effects from other factors. Women, who are heavy
users of cocaine during the first trimester, are also more likely to receive inade-
quate or no early prenatal care, abuse alcohol and other drugs and use tobacco.
They are also less likely to provide proper stimulation to the infant when it is born.
See id. at 222 (noting demographic prevalence of low-income mothers in such
category).
105. See Robert E. Arendt et al., Accuracy of Detecting Prenatal Drug Exposure, 29
J. DRUG IssuEs 203 (1999) (noting results of advanced testing for prenatal cocaine
use). Table One in the Arendt et al. article indicates that mothers who used co-
caine were older, had delivered more children and had fewer prenatal visits. See id.
at 208.
106. See Richardson & Day, supra note 104, at 233 (noting multiple complica-
tions that may lead to death caused by prenatal cocaine use).
107. Even this, however, is subject to doubt. Inmates may be able to get ille-
gal contraband. If the woman is not placed in a drug treatment program immedi-
ately upon incarceration, the end result could be no different than if the addicted
pregnant woman was left in the streets.
108. I will leave aside the possibility of forced sterilization. Compare Buck v.
Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding forced sterilization of third generation
mentally retarded persons), with Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(invalidating, on equal protection grounds, sentencing guidelines authorizing ster-
ilization for certain categories of criminals).
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outside. 10 9 The rate of recidivism is extremely high for drug offenders, 110
as is witnessed by celebrities who, even when jailed, go back to drugs once
they are released, risking their careers and freedom. Darryl Strawberry
and Robert Downey, Jr. are such recent examples, 11' but there are many
others. This occurs notwithstanding their access to the best treatment pro-
grams that money can buy." l 2
The jails and prisons are notorious for poor health care in general,
particularly for women. 31 3 AIDS, breast and uterine cancer and complica-
tions of childbirth do not receive proper medical attention. 114 Whether
we like it or not, drug addiction is a disease-a medical problem, that is
difficult to treat and cure. 1 5 There is no reason to believe that the states,
which provide the most minimal medical care for physical ailments in
prison, will do any better with drug addiction.
109. See Linda M. Whiteford &Judi Vitucci, Pregnancy and Addiction: Translat-
ing Research Into Practice, 44 Soc. SCi. & MED. 1371, 1372 (1997) ("[P]regnant wo-
men incarcerated for substance abuse are rarely provided treatment for their
addiction."); see also Nora S. Gustavsson & Anne E. MacEachron, Criminalizing Wo-
men's Behavior, 27 J. DRUG ISSUES 637, 681 (1997) ("More than half of the drug
treatment facilities in New York City refuse to admit pregnant drug users, and
Massachusetts allocated only 15 residential treatment slots, statewide, to pregnant
women.").
110. See Kim Cobb, Proposition Mandates Treatment, Not Prison: California to Vote
on Drug-War Issue, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 2, 2000, at 1 (noting that sixty to eighty
percent of all California inmates are destined to return to prison). "The General
Accounting Office of Congress... reported that drug offenders who go to prison
are four times as likely to return to prison in five years as people who receive
treatment." Id.
111. See Nightly News (NBC television broadcast, Aug. 5, 2001) (discussing
problems celebrities have with drugs and alcohol abuse and their inability to re-
main drug-free after completing treatment program).
112. See id. (noting that staying sober at rehabilitation can be monumental
challenge for celebrities). This is true for women performers too. Billie Holiday
died poor and addicted to drugs in a treatment hospital. See TeddyJamieson, The
Real Key Is Living the Blues, HERALD (Glasgow, Scotland), Apr. 2, 2001, at 12 (dis-
cussing various women performers that have had drug problems, including Billie
Holiday, Whitney Houston and Janis Joplin).
113. See Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 877 F. Supp 643 (D.D.C.
1994) (noting that female inmates experience higher rate of illness than general
population). The policy of the Department of Corrections states that all new in-
mates "will be seen within 24 hours to determine the health status of the resident."
Id. This was not done for women prisoners. See id. at 643-44 (noting that female
prisoners are not even given pelvic or breast exams during intake examination).
114. See id. at 643-48 (documenting improper healthcare for female inmates).
There are many examples of poor health care given to women in prisons, includ-
ing failure to provide regular breast and pelvic exams, regular prenatal care, pap
smears and testing for sexually transmitted diseases. See id. The only test that was
performed on a regular basis was for tuberculosis. These were likely done because
tuberculosis posed a threat to prison personnel as well as other inmates. See id. at
644 n.11 (citing doctor's testimony regarding reasons for frequency of tests).
115. See Allan I. Leshner, Addiction Is a Brain Disease, ISSUES Sc. & TECH., Apr.
1, 2001, at 75, 80 (stating that there is need to recognize addiction as brain disease
in order to develop effective treatment programs).
[Vol. 47: p. 299
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There is also a problem of rationality with using evidence obtained
from pregnant women to criminally prosecute them. If pregnant women
know that their use of crack cocaine can, and indeed must, be reported to
the police by medical personnel, there is a greater likelihood that they will
not seek prenatal care at all, 116 thus increasing the danger of harm to
both the mother and the fetus. As a matter of policy, therefore, we need
to explore this relationship in greater depth before resorting to imprison-
ment for addicted pregnant women-an expensive and dehumanizing
experience."17
B. Civil Commitment
Would civil commitment statutes be a better solution? Certainly, as a
matter of due process protection, it is an easier route for the state. In In re
Gault,"1 8 the United States Supreme Court held that the civil label of con-
venience would not prevent the imposition of constitutional guarantees in
juvenile court actions to determine if a child is delinquent. 119 The Court
has, however, since strayed from that notion, and it has upheld the consti-
tutionality of proceedings that are labeled civil and result in incarceration,
even though not all criminal law safeguards were in place. For example,
in Allen v. Illinois,120 the Court permitted psychiatric testimony obtained
from interviews with the defendant without Miranda warnings to be intro-
duced at a civil proceeding conducted to declare a person sexually danger-
ous.121 The majority stressed that the commitment proceedings were civil
in nature and that the goal was treatment, not punishment. 22
116. See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 146 n.25. Furthermore, studies indicate "co-
erced treatment is less successful than voluntary treatment." Id.
117. If crack addicted pregnant women do not get prenatal medical care be-
cause they are afraid of self-incrimination and criminal prosecution, there is more
likelihood that the fetus will be harmed. It is extremely difficult for anyone other
than medical personnel providing prenatal care to detect potential harm to the
fetus. This is different than the situation when parents fail to take their abused
child for medical treatment. Other people will see the child and may recognize
the abuse. The child may be in school or may be seen by neighbors or even people
in stores. Any one of these individuals might report suspected child abuse and
some are likely to be mandatory reporters. If a pregnant woman does not seek
medical help, it is less likely that anyone else would recognize the possible abuse to
the fetus, and no help will be provided for the woman or the fetus. Implicit in this
conclusion is that people on drugs do not always manifest behavior indicating drug
use.
118. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
119. See Gault 387 U.S. at 26-27 (noting that essentials of due process may
provide more "therapeutic attitude" for juveniles).
120. 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
121. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 375 (noting that privilege against self-incrimination
is not designed to enhance reliability of fact-finding); see also Kansas v. Hendricks,
521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997) (upholding civil commitment for sexually violent
offenders).
122. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 372-73 (describing state's intentions and purposes
regarding civil commitment).
23
Marrus: Crack Babies and the Constitution: Ruminations about Addicted Pre
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
VILLANovA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47: p. 299
Furthermore, the loss of liberty does not by itself trigger Sixth
Amendment protection.' 2 3 In Middendorf v. Henry,124 the Court held that
there was no right to appointed counsel either under the Sixth or the Fifth
Amendments12 5 at summary courts martial because they were not criminal
prosecutions, even though the possible punishment was thirty days at hard
labor.126 Civil commitment also does not implicate In re Winship.' 27 In
Addington v. Texas,128 involuntary commitment of mentally ill persons to
state hospitals on less than reasonable doubt passed constitutional
muster.
129
Civil commitment, on its face, appears to be less intrusive than jail.
Almost invariably, however, the care occurs in an institution with locks and
bars. As the ChiefJustice noted in Allen, the sexual offender rehabilitation
involved there took place in a maximum security facility.' 30
The question is whether the state would provide higher quality pro-
grams for pregnant women who are civilly committed as opposed to those
in jail. 13 The facilities and treatment that states provide for delinquent
children, also under the guise of rehabilitation, are not comforting in this
regard. The supposed beneficence of the state's exercise of its parens pa-
123. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
124. 425 U.S. 25 (1976).
125. The Fifth Amendment is the due process amendment that applies to the
federal government. The Fourteenth Amendment only applies to the states.
126. See Middendorf, 425 U.S. at 46-48 (noting that individual facing martial
trial was in more favorable position than probationer, who could face much longer
incarceration).
127. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
128. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
129. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 428-30 (noting Texas' belief that various stan-
dards produce comparable results). The Court held that the clear and convincing
standard of proof was necessary for the commitment of the mentally ill. See id. at
425-27 (considering both individuals' interest in not being involuntarily confined,
and state's interest in being able to commit emotionally disturbed). The Court
concluded that beyond a reasonable doubt standard was too difficult for the state
to prove and still protect its citizens. See id. at 428-30 (explaining that this standard
has been historically reserved only for criminal trials). The Court, however,
pointed out that the state should not be permitted to interfere with an individual's
liberty interest without a stronger showing than a preponderance of the evidence.
See id. at 425-27.
130. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 373 (1986) (noting that facility serves sexu-
ally dangerous persons and inmates who need psychiatric treatment). Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist noted that neither the fact that it was a maximum-security prison
nor that other prisoners were housed in the facility influenced the Court's analysis.
See id. (recognizing the state's power to create such facilities to protect commu-
nity). Neither of these factors meant that the state did not have the intent to treat
sexually dangerous individuals rather than punish them.
131. For a further discussion, see supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text
(noting that conditions for women in prison are extremely poor).
322
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triae power over children13 2 too often results in decrepit buildings, l 33 cor-
poral punishment 3 4 and lack of proper medical care. l35 Nor have the
states done much better with respect to the mentally ill' 3 6 or mentally
retarded.1
3 7
Overall, I view criminal incarceration and civil commitment as six of
one, half a dozen of another. To be sure, civil commitment does not re-
sult in a criminal record for the woman. In terms of freedom and quality
medical care, however, the differences seem relatively slight.
C. Equal Protection Concerns
Civil commitment proceedings, as well as criminal prosecutions
against pregnant addicted women to protect their fetuses, would of course
apply only to females. Under current law, that may not of itself create an
equal protection problem. The reality, however, is that it will fall dispro-
portionately on poor minority women.
138
Where women are selected for different treatment because of preg-
nancy, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court is complex. Although the
Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment of 1978139 makes pregnancy a pro-
tected class for purposes of Title VII, 1 4 0 which defines pregnancy-based
discrimination as "sex discrimination," this is not true for equal protection
claims. In 1974, the Supreme Court held in Geduldig v. Aiello141 that Cali-
fornia's denial of state disability benefits for work loss resulting from a
132. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984) (holding that the state has
interest in protecting juveniles through its parens patriae power and in protecting
community through its police power).
133. See Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1359-
62 (D.R.I. 1972) (describing cold, dark, damp quarters that juveniles were kept in
without toilet paper, blankets, etc.).
134. See Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 356 (7th Cir. 1974) (finding that hit-
ting juveniles with "fraternity paddle" was cruel and unusual punishment).
135. See Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 72-83 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (noting
inevitability of such repressive measures in large institutions), rev'd, 535 F.2d 864
(5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 988 (1977).
136. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 581 (1975) (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting) (holding that states must provide at least minimal treatment for non-dan-
gerous, mentally ill patients committed to state mental health hospitals when
plaintiff had been incarcerated for twenty-five years without any treatment).
137. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (holding that men-
tally retarded have right to reasonably safe conditions and minimal training to
protect their interests).
138. Because the poor are least likely to be able to effectively challenge the
quality of services and treatment, these programs will effectively be shielded from
judicial supervision. Recent legislative changes prevent legal aid organizations
from representing individuals in class action suits. This also will make it difficult
for these laws to be challenged.
139. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
140. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(a)-
2000e(c) (1994).
141. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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normal pregnancy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Instead of treating the issue as a matter of classifica-
tion on the grounds of gender, which would subject it to heightened
scrutiny, the Court distinguished between two groups-one consisting of
"pregnant women," and the second, of "nonpregnant persons." 4 2 As a
result, the Court considered the case a "far cry" from sex-based discrimina-
tion, and therefore, held that "lawmakers are constitutionally free to in-
clude or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as this
on any reasonable basis ... ."143 This is merely rational relationship scru-
tiny, a standard that is usually very easy for the state to satisfy. 14
International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls145 also was based on differ-
ences in reproductive roles between men and women, but it was a Title VII
case, not a constitutional decision. The Court ruled that employers' "fetal
protection policies" were invalid because they banned all fertile women
from workplace environments that were said to pose reproductive risks
due to chemical or lead exposure. Writing for the majority, Justice Black-
mun held that the plain language of the statute made it clear that such
policies were facially discriminatory because they were based specifically
142. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20.
143. Id.
144. The one constitutional case in which the Supreme Court invalidated dis-
crimination based on pregnancy was a due process claim, rather than an equal
protection claim. In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974),
the Court found that the school district's policy of forcing pregnant teachers out
of the classroom at four months, based on an irrebuttable presumption of unfit-
ness, violated the Due Process Clause. See id. at 644 (noting that this policy intends
to keep incapacitated, pregnant teachers out of classrooms). The viability of the
irrebuttable presumption line of cases is in doubt.
The problems associated with equal protection are further illustrated by a re-
cent citizenship case. See Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053, 2057-58 (2001) (relating
to case where lawful United States resident, who was born out of wedlock in Viet-
nam, was to be deported based on decision of Board of Immigration Appeals).
The Court validated a statute that outlined the procedure one must take to prove
citizenship when one's father is a citizen and one's mother is an alien. See id. at
2059 (noting statute passes equal protection test, which requires an important gov-
ernmental interest and that discriminatory means be substantially related to objec-
tive). The procedure for proving citizenship is different if one's mother is the
citizen and one's father is the alien. See id. The majority reached this result by
denying that gender-based discrimination was involved. See id. at 2056 (discussing
congressional intent). Instead, it viewed the distinction as one between fathers,
who met the requirements of the statute, and ones that did not. The dissent, coin-
cidentally including both Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg, viewed the law as a
"sex-based statute." See id. at 2067 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining that sex-
based statutes, even when reflecting typical characteristics of men and/or women,
deny individual's opportunities). Therefore, the dissent would have applied
heightened scrutiny and struck it down for lack of an "exceedingly persuasive"
justification. See id. (noting that equal protection demands proper application of
heightened scrutiny to sex-based classification); see also United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
145. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
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on pregnancy. 14 6 Of course, this ruling also reflects the equation of preg-
nancy discrimination with sex discrimination in the statute.
Clearly, it is important to first determine whether criminal prosecu-
tion and civil commitment of pregnant addicted women to protect the
fetus are sex-based. If the Court determines, as it indicated in previous
cases, that such actions are not sex based, a successful equal protection
challenge would be difficult.147 As is apparent from Washington v. Da-
vis,148 proof of disparate impact alone would not be enough-intentional
discrimination on the grounds of gender is required. If intentional sex-
based treatment is found, the state must satisfy the intermediate standard
of equal protection analysis by demonstrating an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" for that action. 149 Although this standard of review is not
strict scrutiny according to the Court, "the burden of justification is de-
manding, and it rests entirely on the State." 50
Although the government's interest in protecting the unborn child is
"important," as is required by the intermediate level of review associated
with sex discrimination, it might be difficult for these statutes to meet the
second part of the test, which requires they be "substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives." 15 1 There is evidence that crack addicted
pregnant women are less likely to seek medical help early in their preg-
nancy,' 52 and therefore, neither criminal prosecution nor civil commit-
ment is likely to help prevent damage to the fetus, as this is more likely to
occur early on in the pregnancy. 15 3 Furthermore, studies indicate that if
pregnant women know they can be prosecuted for drug use or child
abuse, they do not seek medical treatment. 154 Thus, if these prosecutions
146. See Int'l Union, 499 U.S. at 199 (stating that Court's conclusion is bol-
stered by Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which includes pregnancy as a basis of
discrimination).
147. But see Thurman v. Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1526 (D. Conn. 1984)
(noting that gender classifications would be valid if substantially related to impor-
tant governmental objective or purpose). Thurman is a much-cited lower court
opinion, in which the plaintiff alleged that city police "consistently afforded lesser
protection.... when the victim is (1) a woman abused or assaulted by a spouse or
boyfriend, or (2) a child abused by a father or stepfather." Id. at 1527. The court
held a claim under the Equal Protection Clause was properly asserted. See id. (not-
ing that equal protection is applied to legislative action and discriminatory govern-
mental action in administration and enforcement of law).
148. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
149. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 (1996).
150. Id. at 533 (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
724 (1982)).
151. Id.
152. This is more likely due to the woman's poverty and likelihood of home-
lessness than her lack of concern regarding the unborn child. See GOMEZ, supra
note 1, at 17 (noting correlation between poverty and drug addiction).
153. For a further discussion, see supra note 104 and accompanying text.
154. For a further discussion, see supra note 116 and accompanying text.
Most crack addicted pregnant women, however, are aware of the effect their drug
use can have on their unborn child and would prefer to stop using drugs during
2002]
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are considered gender based, the elevated means analysis might pose con-
stitutional difficulties.
Even if the Court does not determine that such actions are gender
based, there is a possibility, admittedly unlikely, that the actions could be
considered race based. The Davis disparate impact problem is still an ob-
stacle. 155  Intentional class based discrimination must be shown.' 5
6
Where the impact is extremely disproportionate, however, that may be
taken as evidence of purposeful racial bias.15 7 For example, there is some
evidence that doctors treat women of color differently when ordering inva-
sive medical procedures. One study found that women were racial minori-
ties in eighty-one percent of the cases in which doctors sought court
ordered obstetrical interventions.1 58
To the extent that the prosecution of addicted pregnant women is
based on the use of crack cocaine, one might argue that this too consti-
tutes racial discrimination. Statistics indicate that approximately ninety-
five percent of persons prosecuted for possession of crack in federal court
are African American, 159 while the reverse is true for possession of powder
cocaine. 160 Furthermore, the sentence for crack is much higher than it is
for cocaine. 161 The lower courts have nonetheless refused to invalidate
the disparate sentences.162 It is problematic whether such statistics would
their pregnancy. See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 17 ("In one study of severely addicted
women, 50 percent reported reducing their drug use while they were pregnant,
and another 25 percent reported abstaining from use for the duration of their
pregnancy.").
155. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 239 (1976) (noting that primary pur-
pose of Equal Protection Clause is prevention of race discrimination).
156. See id. at 241 (stating that once "prima facie" case of discrimination is
demonstrated, burden shifts to state to "rebut presumption of unconstitutional
action") (citing Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)).
157. For example, in the venerable case, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886), the Court found that a facially neutral law that was enforced almost exclu-
sively against Chinese laundries violated the Equal Protection Clause. Similarly, in
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropol-
itan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the Court considered evidence
of racially disparate impact to support an inference of discrimination, albeit in the
context of voting rights.
158. See Deborah J. Krauss, Note, Regulating Women's Bodies: The Adverse Effect of
Fetal Rights Theory on Childbirth Decisions and Women of Color, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 523, 531 (1991) (noting that minorities, African Americans, Asian Americans
and Latinos, were treated differently when receiving medical care).
159. See United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709, 711 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing that
"92.6 percent of those convicted of crack cocaine charges nationally were African
American, as opposed to 4.7 who were white").
160. See id. (noting disparate number of powder cocaine charges as compared
to crack cocaine charges against African Americans).
161. See id. at 712 (providing for ten-year minimum sentence for those per-
sons found possessing fifty grams or more of cocaine base [crack] and similar ten-
year minimum sentence imposed for those possessing over 5,000 grams of powder
cocaine) (citing 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (b) (1) (A) (iii)).
162. See id. (refusing to find that Congress was racially motivated in establish-
ing sentencing guidelines).
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be sufficient to show that "crack baby" prosecutions are racially discrimina-
tory in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 16 3 In sum, while use of
both criminal prosecution and civil commitment as sanctions against preg-
nant, addicted women raises equal protection concerns, constitutional
challenges on that basis are unlikely to meet with much success, at least in
the absence of proof of intentional sex based discrimination.
III. EVIDENCE OF DRUG ABUSE DURING PREGNANCY AS A BASIS FOR
TEMPORARILY REMOVING A CHILD FROM PARENTAL CUSTODY
AND FOR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
As an alternative to criminal or civil incarceration of crack addicted
pregnant women, the state may turn to civil dependency actions, also
called child abuse and neglect proceedings, both as a spur to get the wo-
man into treatment and as a means to protect the fetus and any other
children the woman may have. Civil dependency actions can be both for
temporary removal of a child 164 and for permanent termination of paren-
tal rights. 16 5 While temporary removal is less intrusive than termination, it
is not without consequences for the mother and child. There are few pub-
lished opinions regarding temporary removal, 16 6 but a discussion and
analysis of the process involved will help clarify the issues.
163. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 294 (1987) (rejecting African-
American defendant's argument that statistical study indicating that race was a fac-
tor in imposition of capital punishment in Georgia established equal protection
violation because petitioner must prove purposeful discrimination in his particular
case). Thus, statistical studies alone may be insufficient to show proof of
discrimination.
It would be even more difficult to complain about the selection of poor wo-
men as targets of such statutes. See San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
55 (1973) (declining to recognize indigence as specially protected class).
164. See, e.g., In rejessica M., 586 A.2d 597, 605 (Conn. 1991) (finding that
child could be temporarily removed from mother's care, but there was not suffi-
cient evidence to sustain termination of parental rights).
165. See, e.g., In rejamie R., 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 123, 128 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that termination is proper when state provided services to try and reunite
family, children were adoptable and adoption was least detrimental alternative).
166. There are two reasons for the lack of appellate cases with regard to the
temporary removal of a child from the parents' custody. First, the majority of par-
ents who find themselves involved with the dependency system are poor and can-
not afford an appellate attorney or the transcript necessary for an appeal. The
Court's decision in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996), which requires the state to
provide transcripts for indigents appealing termination of parental rights, would
not apply to temporary removal decisions. Second, the jurisdictional and disposi-
tional hearings are not considered final hearings and may not be appealable.
More often than not, the only hearing that can be appealed is the termination.
The appropriateness of the removal, however, will also be considered by the appel-
late court at the termination appeal.
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A. Temporary Removal
Currently all states have statutes that allow filing of an abuse and neg-
lect petition relating to a child born to a drug abusing woman. 167 That is,
the petition can be filed only after the child is born. 168 In some jurisdic-
tions, the laws allow automatic removal of a child born with illegal drugs in
his or her system. 169 Other states permit removal of the child born testing
positive for drugs only if there are other indications that harm may come
to the child, such as the parent's inability to provide proper care-food,
housing or medical treatment. 170 In yet another group of states, even if
the child is born "tox positive," the courts have found removal improper
because the child was only a fetus at the time of the mother's use of drugs,
and such courts interpret their statutes as to require that the mother's
abuse occur only after the child is born.' 7 1 Since such statutes permit the
filing of a petition to remove the child only after the child is born, they
may not act as a strong incentive to a drug abusing pregnant woman to get
treatment before the child is born; nor will they provide sufficient protec-
tion for the fetus.
Nevertheless, what if the pregnant drug abusing woman has other
children? For example, a woman has one child and goes to the doctor for
a pregnancy test. She is pregnant for the second time, and the urine test
also indicates the presence of illegal drugs in her system. The doctor
warns her of the possible harm to the fetus and encourages her to enter
treatment. She refuses, and the doctor then reports the positive drug re-
sults to the child protective services agency. Caseworkers investigate and
find that the mother is addicted to illegal drugs. As with removal actions
for a newborn child, in some states, mere drug use by itself is sufficient to
authorize removal of the addict's other children without any inquiry as to
whether, aside from the addiction, the woman demonstrates decent
parenting skills. 1 72 In other jurisdictions, there must be a nexus between
the addiction and the mother's ability to care for her other children. For
example, the court might consider additional actions by the parents such
as "the withholding of parental attention and care, and the diversion of
family resources in order to support a drug habit .... [resulting in] neg-
167. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 39.01 (West 2000); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.001 (Vernon 2000).
168. See, e.g., Ex. rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729, 740 (Wis. 1997)
(stating that petition for child in need of protection cannot be filed with respect to
fetus because it must be child that is born).
169. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.68(2)(f) (West 2000).
170. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (b) (West 2000) (stating there
can be finding of abuse if parent fails to provide "regular care" for their child due
to substance abuse).
171. See, e.g., In re Fletcher, 533 N.Y.S.2d 241, 243 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1988) (re-
jecting notion that prenatal conduct alone could constitute finding of neglect of
child after it is born leading to removal of child from mother).
172. For a further discussion, see supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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lect and lack of nurture for the child."1 73 Without this additional evi-
dence of maltreatment, in these states, there can be no removal of the
woman's other children, on the theory that drug abusing women do not
necessarily neglect or abuse their children.
In all states, social workers and drug abusing pregnant women, with
or without other children, are authorized to enter into voluntary agree-
ments in which the state foregoes a civil suit to remove the child if the
mother takes the necessary steps to protect her children. 174 For the crack
addicted pregnant woman, this would mean entering a drug treatment
program. In the states that direct automatic removal of other children of
substance abusing pregnant women, if the mother refuses to enter the
program or discontinues treatment, a removal petition will be filed. In
those states that require more than just addiction, whether a petition is
filed depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 175
Assuming the caseworker has sufficient grounds to file a petition, ei-
ther because drug use is an automatic basis for removal, or because there
is other evidence demonstrating parental unfitness, there will be a hearing
to determine if removal is proper and necessary. 176 As a matter of federal
constitutional law, the indigent mother is not entitled to an attorney at
these temporary removal proceedings1 77 although some states do assign
attorneys, particularly when it appears that there will ultimately be a termi-
nation hearing.' 78 The burdens of proof at these proceedings range from
173. In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 736 A.2d 1246, 1254 (N.J. 1999). The New
Jersey Supreme Court found that other factors besides a mother's drug use, indi-
cate continued neglect or abuse by the parent. See id.
174. This can happen in one of two ways. The child protective services
agency may leave the child in the home with the mother and provide services for
the family. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West 2000) ("[Nlothing in this
section is intended to limit the offering of voluntary services to those families in
need of assistance but who do not come within the descriptions of this section").
In other situations, the agency may try to convince a parent to voluntarily relin-
quish custody for a short period of time to correct things in the home. See N.Y.
Soc. SERV. LAw § 358-a, 384-a (McKinney 2000) (allowing for voluntary placement
of child for up to thirty days without filing of petition); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 263.003 (Vernon 2000) (allowing voluntary placement of child for up to sixty
days prior to filing petition).
175. In reality, however, such voluntary agreements are seldom used. Be-
cause of the limited personnel and resources, child protective agencies rarely pro-
vide preventive services for at risk families, and they are even less likely to extend
programs to protect an unborn child.
176. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.105 (Vernon 2000) (hearing must be
held within one working day of time child is taken into custody without court or-
der); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201 (Vernon 2000) (requiring full adversary
hearing within fourteen days after child is taken into custody).
177. The Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue. The Court has deter-
mined, however, that under certain circumstances parents may be entitled to an
attorney at a termination proceeding. See infra notes 205-07 and accompanying
text.
178. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-129(b) (iv) (West 2000) (granting attor-
ney for indigent parent at hearing).
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reasonable suspicion 179 to clear and convincing. 180 Evidence obtained
from mandatory reporters is generally admissible in civil dependency ac-
tions to remove the child (or for that matter, to terminate parental
rights). 18 1 Claims that the incriminating information was confidential and
thus inadmissible, or that the exclusionary rule applies, 182 are routinely
rejected by the courts. 183 The basis for using confidential information,
either from doctors, nurses, teachers, therapists or social workers, is that it
is necessary for the court to have access to all information so as to make an
informed judgment as to what is in the best interest of the child. It is these
professionals who are more likely to first learn of the abuse, and who are
in a better position to provide the information necessary to protect the
children.
Parental neglect and abuse resulting in temporary removal of chil-
dren outweighs the parents' fundamental right to the care, custody and
179. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-129(b) (West 2000) (allowing place-
ment of child outside home to continue if, at hearing, "there is reasonable cause to
believe" child is suffering physical danger).
180. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361(c) (West 2000) (requiring finding, by
clear and convincing evidence, that child is in substantial danger for removal of
child from parent's home).
181. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-129(g) (West 2000) (allowing presenta-
tion of hearsay evidence at removal hearing when such has been made to
mandatory reporter).
182. The Supreme Court has not ruled on these issues, but in various types of
civil proceedings, even where the deprivation is great, the Court has held that the
exclusionary rule does not apply. In United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), the
Court held that the exclusionary rule did not apply in a federal civil tax proceed-
ing. In INS v. Lapez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), the Court held that the exclu-
sionary rule was not applicable to deportation proceedings. Even where the
proceeding can lead to criminal prosecution, as with grand jury hearings, the
Court refuses to apply the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (finding that exclusionary rule has never been "interpreted to
proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all per-
sons"). Therefore, even though a civil abuse and neglect action can result in a
criminal prosecution for child abuse, it would probably not trigger the exclusion-
ary rule.
The Court dislikes the exclusionary rule because it suppresses reliable evi-
dence and often helps the guilty. Therefore, it would be surprising if the federal
exclusionary rule were found applicable in civil proceedings to temporarily remove
a child, which is not considered as much of a deprivation as some other losses, and
is permitted in order for the state to exercise its parens patriae power of protecting
the child. State courts also are unlikely to find the exclusionary rule applicable in
child protective hearings either as a matter of federal or state law. In State v. CK,
982 P.2d 73 (Utah 1999), the Utah Supreme Court stated that whether the exclu-
sionary rule applies depends on the type of proceeding. The purpose of civil child
protection proceedings is to protect children and their interests, and in fact, "chil-
dren are removed only when it is in their best interest," not for "'punishment' to
the parent." Id. at 78.
183. See Betty J.B. v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 460 A.2d 528, 532 (Del. 1983) (hold-
ing that mother's right to exert privilege in regard to her mental health records
had to bow to court being able to determine child's well-being).
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control of their offspring. 184 In jurisdictions in which removal may be
ordered on something less than clear and convincing evidence, 185 the
court is likely to grant the request for removal of a child from addicted
parents.' 86 Before the judge grants removal, however, the state must show
that removing the children from the parents' care is the least restrictive
alternative available, and the least detrimental to the welfare of the chil-
dren. 18 7 In jurisdictions where the evidentiary standard for removal is
clear and convincing, 188 it may be more difficult for the state to justify
even temporary removal of the children. Regardless of the strength of the
burden of proof at this stage, however, as a matter of practice, the courts
tend to resolve doubts in favor of removal.'
89
In the jurisdictional phase, the court makes a finding of civil neglect
or abuse if there is sufficient evidence. °90 The state agency then develops
a plan for the family. Thereafter, a dispositional hearing is held. At that
time, the judge will determine the temporary placement of the children
and approve a mandatory service plan. Where substance abuse is an issue,
one condition of the plan will usually be that the mother enter into a
residential drug treatment program, attend on an outpatient basis or sub-
mit to periodic drug testing. 191 The service plan is likely to have other
requirements, as it is rare in such cases that substance abuse is the only
184. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (holding state
law requiring children to attend public schools unconstitutional because it inter-
fered with "the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and edu-
cation of children under their control"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923) (invalidating state law prohibiting teaching of modern foreign languages to
young children as it interfered with the fundamental right of "individual[s] ... to
marry, establish a home and bring up children").
185. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (requiring clear and
convincing evidence as proof in termination of parental rights cases, but not in
removal cases in findings of neglect).
186. See Hardy v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 568 So. 2d 1314,
1316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (concluding that finding of neglect can be based on
preponderance of evidence).
187. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201 (Vernon 2000) (requiring, for
removal of child from parents' home, finding that "remain[ing] in the home is
contrary to the welfare of the child," that there is urgent need for protection and
that reasonable efforts were made to prevent removal of child from home).
188. For further discussion, see supra note 180 and accompanying text.
189. As a public defender and as Director of the Clinical Programs at the
University of Houston Law Center, I have observed that judges normally err on the
side of caution and will remove a child from the home based on the recommenda-
tions of the child protective services agency caseworker.
190. During the first hearing, the court determines if there is abuse and neg-
lect. Then, if there is sufficient evidence, the court adjudicates the child a depen-
dent of the court.
191. Every state has statutes dictating the contents of the service plan that
must be developed between the state agency and the parents. See TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 263.102 (a) (3) (Vernon 2000). The service plan must be in writing, spe-
cific, state a goal for the plan, provide actions and responsibilities necessary in
order for the child to be returned and who the parents can contact for informa-
tion regarding their child and services. The plan is developed between the agency
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problem the family is facing. The parents will have to address these other
issues as well. 192 If the mother refuses or discontinues treatment, fails
drug tests or violates other conditions of the service plan, she will not have
her children returned to her, and the state may remove the child with
whom she is pregnant once he or she is born.193
In the above scenarios, a petition is filed only if the addicted woman
has already given birth or if she has other children. Another possibility,
which no state now pursues, is a statute that allows the filing of an abuse
and neglect petition regarding the fetus before birth, even if the woman
has no other children, if the addicted pregnant woman refuses treatment.
In such circumstances, without such a statute, the state cannot use an
abuse or neglect proceeding to spur the woman into treatment. The Wis-
consin Supreme Court in Ex rel. Angela M. W. v. Kruzicki'9 4 refused to find
that the meaning of the word "child" in civil dependency actions included
the fetus.' 95 The court explained that it would be difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to apply the statutory scheme that was in place if the legislature had
meant for the term child to mean a fetus in addition to a child already
born. Under the statutes, said the court, a "child" may be taken into cus-
tody if the child's welfare necessitates that he or she be removed from the
home, a parent must be notified of where the "child" is placed within
twenty-four hours, and every effort must be made to return a "child" in
custody to the parent as soon as possible. None of these provisions could
be applied to a fetus. 196
Presumably, states do not permit the filing of such petitions before
the child is born on the belief that the woman will not appreciate that her
conduct during pregnancy will result in removal when the child is deliv-
ered. Thus, because there is no incentive for the woman to enter into
treatment, there is nothing the state could do to protect the fetus. Such a
position may be too pessimistic. The actual filing of the petition may be a
way of demonstrating to the woman, particularly those with no other chil-
dren, the consequences of a refusal to enter and stay in treatment. If the
threat of future removal does not work, the only legal option for the state
and the parents and must be signed by all parties. The court is responsible for
reviewing the service plan on a regular basis.
192. See, e.g., In reJ.J., 737 N.E.2d 1080, 1083 (Ill. App. 2000) (noting that
caseworker had developed several plans for family over duration of case, and al-
though primary cause of abuse stemmed from alcohol consumption, service plans
included such objectives as "attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and
parenting classes, achievement of financial stability and maintenance of a clean
and safe home").
193. See In re Latifah P., 735 N.E.2d 1004, 1010 (Ill. App. 2000) (finding that
mother did not complete requirements to establish her fitness and, therefore,
could not have her children returned to her).
194. 561 N.W.2d 729 (Wis. 1997).
195. See Ex rel. Angela M. W, 561 N.W.2d at 740 (noting that it is legislative
function to define "child").
196. See id. at 736 (stating that inclusion of phrase "viable fetus" within defini-
tion of "child" would render "absurd" results).
[Vol. 47: p. 299
34
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol47/iss2/1
CRACK BABIES AND THE CONSTITUTION
in dealing with an addicted pregnant woman with no other children
would be criminal or civil commitments.
This option of temporary removal of an addicted baby, or the
mother's other children, although coercive, may not seem as blunt an in-
strument of social control as jail or civil commitment. It permits for more
focused decisions regarding the best interests of the child. Some women
will be deterred by the possibility of losing their child or children, and
others will not. This approach, though, allows those decisions to be made
on a case-by-case basis.
There are, however, three realities implicated here. One, noted
above, is that there is a paucity of drug treatment centers, particularly for
women who are pregnant. 197 Most drug treatment programs have been
designed for men and have ignored the special needs of women, let alone
pregnant women. Another difficulty is that child welfare caseworkers la-
bor under huge caseloads and have limited resources. Their attention is,
of necessity, directed to more severe and direct forms of child abuse. 19 8
Lastly, there is a major shortage of quality foster homes. 199 Crack ad-
dicted babies are more likely to need specialized care. There are even
fewer options available for this group of children. Although it appears to
be counterintuitive, it is not clear that it would be better to remove chil-
dren from their homes, even with drug addicted parents (absent any other
form of abuse), and place them in overcrowded, poorly run and some-
times dangerous foster homes.20 0
B. Termination
Assume the court removes a crack addicted baby and his or her sib-
lings. What next? That depends on the jurisdiction. As with temporary
removal statutes, some states explicitly permit termination of parental
197. In fact, many programs explicitly exclude pregnant women. For a fur-
ther discussion, see supra note 109 and accompanying text.
198. Not only are there limited resources for child protective services agen-
cies, but the number of reports of child abuse have been steadily rising. See Ellen
Marrus, Please Keep My Secret: Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, Confidentiality, and Juve-
nile Delinquency, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509, 515 n.30 (1998) (noting that
caseworkers have little time to file reports, which typically yield "unsubstantiated
allegations of abuse").
199. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHILD WELFARE: COMPLEX NEEDS STRAIN
CAPACITY TO PROVIDE SERVICES (1995) (citing reasons for decline in number of
foster homes, including low reimbursement rates, more children with special
needs, inadequate support services and better employment opportunities outside
the home).
200. It is not surprising that foster homes do not always provide quality care.
In one survey, only twelve percent of the foster homes had received any type of
pre-placement training, and only twenty-one percent had been visited by a social
worker prior to a child being placed in the home. See Marsha Garrison, Why Termi-
nate Parental Rights?, 35 STu. L. REv. 423, 430 n.36 (1983) (emphasizing problems
associated with foster home care).
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rights based solely on the baby's addiction.2 0 1 In those states, the
mother's addiction alone may also serve as a basis for terminating parental
rights with respect to all her children. 20 2 Some states have generally
worded provisions permitting termination for endangering the safety and
welfare of the child, 20 3 and they can easily be read to cover the cases of
crack babies and their siblings. Such laws, however, require more than the
mother's addiction to drugs, such as the mother not providing appropri-
ate food or care for the infant or other children. 20
4
This is an extreme remedy, potentially even more severe than incar-
ceration, and one that is constrained by constitutional procedural guaran-
tees beyond those that are required for temporary removal. The federal
constitutionally mandated burden of proof is clear and convincing evi-
dence.2 0 5 Moreover, indigent mothers may be entitled to an attorney as a
matter of due process, under the Fourteenth Amendment, depending on
the complexity of the case, the likelihood of future criminal charges and
the ability of the mother to represent herself.20 6 Furthermore, some states
provide attorneys in every termination case as a matter of state law. 2
0 7
These procedural protections, however, mask an inescapable catch-
22. Most quality treatment programs require at least one year to com-
plete, 20 8 and there can be up to a year lag period before the woman can
201. Regarding termination, however, the court must additionally find it is in
the best interests of the child. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(h) (West
2000) (stating that "wishes" of minor must also be weighed).
202. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-18-7(2) (2000) (citing, as one ground for termi-
nation, "excessive use of alcohol or controlled substances").
203. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-112(j) (West 2001) (permitting
termination of parental rights if parent "has failed ... to achieve such degree of
personal rehabilitation" that there could be no reasonable belief that child could
be returned home in reasonable length of time).
204. Termination petitions generally are not filed until the child is born.
There are two exceptions to this general rule. First, if a woman attempts an abor-
tion and it fails, termination proceedings may be started prior to the birth of the
child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.006(a) (Vernon 2000) (authorizing repre-
sentative of Department of Protective and Regulatory Services to assume care, con-
trol and custody of child born alive, notwithstanding an abortion, as defined by
Chapter 161). Second, if a man ignores his financial responsibility for the unborn
child, termination proceedings may be filed prior to birth. See TEx. FA. CODE
ANN. § 161.001 (1) (H) (Vernon 2000) (requiring that male act "voluntarily" and
"with knowledge of the pregnancy" when he fails to provide financial support). In
both cases, termination is not final until after the birth of the child.
205. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982).
206. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 33-34 (1981) (noting that
assistance of appointed counsel applies to indigents in parental termination cases
under certain circumstances).
207. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(f) (2) (West 2000) (requiring that
if parent appears without counsel and is unable to afford counsel, court shall ap-
point counsel for parent, unless parent knowingly and intelligently waives such
representation).
208. See Debra Melani, Scarred for Life Drug Addicts Battle a Disease That Has No
Cure, RocKv MrN. NEWS (Denver), May 29, 2001, at 3D (noting that plan created by
patient and doctor is most effective).
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even get into the treatment program.2° 9 All termination statutes, how-
ever, give the mother whose child or children have been temporarily re-
moved, only a year, or at the outside, eighteen months, to show that she is
a fit parent. 210 These short time schedules have been imposed on states as
a condition of receiving federal funds for foster care placements. 21 1 If at
the twelve-month hearing the state presents evidence to show that the par-
ents did not improve the home situation, and that it is still unsafe to re-
turn the children to them, the court may terminate parental rights. The
exception to this is if there is proof that the child is likely to return home
within the following six months, the judge may allow parents a total of
eighteen months to become fit.212 But even this expanded time period
would still ordinarily be insufficient for a woman to enter into and com-
plete a quality substance abuse program.
Moreover, even if the mother could get into a program and complete
it in eighteen months, there would still be a waiting period to see how the
mother would do out of the program and with the child back in her care.
If the child was returned within the eighteen-month period, the state may
retain jurisdiction to determine how well the family is doing.2 13 If the
mother slips, though, as many crack addicts do, and turns to drugs again,
even for a short period of time, the children will again be removed. 214
The state can then seek termination immediately as the eighteen-month
period has passed.
209. See, e.g., Maia Davis, New Jersey Falls Far Short in Treating Addiction Study:
Halfof Those in Need Turned Away, REcoRD (Bergen County), Aug. 16, 2001, at Al
(stating that 67,000 adults seeking drug treatment in New Jersey are able to find
treatment immediately, but 71,000 adults are turned away or are on waiting lists);
Jennifer Smith, California's Equitable Proposition: Drug Sentencing Favors Treatment,
NEWSDAY, July 23, 2001, at A6 (stating that finding a publicly-funded drug treat-
ment program in California can take up to six months).
210. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(a) (3) (West 2000) (noting that
court-ordered services may not exceed eighteen months after date child was origi-
nally removed from physical custody of parent or guardian).
211. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 671 (C) (2001) (requiring that, "if continuation of rea-
sonable efforts ... is determined to be inconsistent with the permanency plan for
the child, reasonable efforts shall be made to place the child in a timely manner in
accordance with the permanency plan, and to complete whatever steps are neces-
sary to finalize the permanent placement of the child"); 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5) (C)
(2001) (defining "case review system"). Under this approach, a hearing is re-
quired to determine the best interests of the child. See id. (noting various courts
and administrative bodies that have jurisdiction over such matters). Various deter-
minations may be made regarding the future status of the child. See id. (stating
that child may be "returned to parent," "remain in foster care" or be placed for
"adoption"). There is a different goal for children over the age of sixteen. See id.
(encouraging transition from foster care to "independent living").
212. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE 361.5 (West 2000) (stating that court
may only extend jurisdictional time period for dependency case if there is substan-
tial probability that child will be returned to parent's physical custody or that rea-
sonable services have not been provided to parents).
213. For a further discussion, see supra note 210 and accompanying text.
214. For a further discussion, see supra notes 167-75 and accompanying text.
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In effect, therefore, a mother and her child or children may have to
be separated for up to two and a half years before a permanent decision
can be made as to the children's future. What we have is a tension be-
tween the right of a child to have a permanent and nurturing home, and
the right of a parent to the care and custody of her children. This is an
exquisitely difficult choice, one that could be ameliorated if the states
would put more resources into drug treatment programs than into the
building of more jails.
Indeed, one might argue that unless the state provides significant
treatment programs for pregnant women, it should be unable to remove
her children or terminate parental rights. In fact, under federal guide-
lines, states cannot terminate parental rights unless there is a showing that
the state has provided "reasonable services" to the parent.2 15 Reasonable,
however, is a fuzzy term that may encompass de minimis efforts by the
state.2
16
Prior to termination, the court holds a permanency planning hearing
where the judge determines a permanent placement for the child based
on the state's recommendation. 217 In most jurisdictions, the court can
consider three options. First, the child may be returned to the parents'
care if the situation has improved, and it is safe for the child.2 18 Second, if
the child cannot return home, the state may seek to terminate parental
rights and place the child for adoption. 2 19 Third, the child may be placed
with a relative, in long-term foster care or in a group home. 220 Some juris-
dictions also permit juvenile guardianships, a placement midway between
foster care and adoption.221 It is similar to long-term foster care, but
under the guardianship, it is more difficult for parents to seek custody of
215. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94
Stat. 500 (1980) (establishing federal laws mandating adoption, foster care and
child removal procedures).
216. See generally, Christine H. Kim, Note, Putting Reason Back Into the Reasona-
ble Efforts Requirements in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 287, 296
(arguing that states define "reasonable" through statute or case law); Shawn I. Ray-
mond, Note, Where Are the Reasonable Efforts to Enforce the Reasonable Efforts Require-
ment? Monitoring State Compliance Under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act
of 1980, 77 TEX. L. REv. 1235, 1247 (1999) (discussing study that found only "thirty
seconds" was devoted to review average child's case).
217. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26 (West 2000) (enumerating
exclusive procedure for terminating parental rights or establishing guardianship of
dependant minors).
218. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.21 (West 2000) (requiring status re-
view hearings for all dependant minors).
219. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(b) (1) (West 2000) (granting
court authority to permanently terminate parental rights and order minor be
placed for adoption).
220. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(b) (4) (West 2000) (vesting
court with power to place child in foster care, subject to review ofjuvenile court).
221. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(b) (3) (West 2000) (permit-
ting court to appoint legal guardian without terminating parental rights).
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their children, and the state no longer supervises the placement.222 In
such placements, however, parents may visit their children and are respon-
sible for paying child support.223 The state can seek any variant of this
third option if it remains unsafe for the child to return home, but it would
not be in the child's best interests to terminate parental rights. This might
occur if the child is older and strongly bonded to the parent, the child is
not likely to be adopted because of age or special needs or the person who
has been caring temporarily for the child is willing to have the child live
with him or her until age eighteen, but is not in a position to adopt.224
Difficult as it may be to accept, drug-abusing women do not always
neglect or abuse their children, and the state should proceed slowly
before terminating the natural parent-child relationship when there is no
other evidence of maltreatment. 22 5 Thus, not every parent's rights should
be terminated, even if the mother is an addict. When the mother other-
wise demonstrates good parenting skills, as many do, courts will often let
her keep her children. Courts may dissolve legal bonds between parent
and child, but the emotional ties often remain.
There are, of course, other means to protect the unborn child of a
crack addicted pregnant woman that may be more effective than any of
the previously discussed methods. Providing additional resources to de-
velop more programs that specifically target drug abusing women before
they become pregnant or early in their pregnancy, is more likely to have a
positive effect on decreasing the number of children born addicted to
222. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(D) (4) (West 2000) (relying
on this method when adoption or termination of parental rights are not in best
interest of child).
223. See id. (allowing for parental visitations unless court finds visitation would
be psychologically damaging to child).
224. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(c)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2000)
(listing options before court if court finds termination would be detrimental to
child).
225. When I was a public defender in California, I represented an alcoholic
father, whose wife was addicted to crack cocaine. She had three children, and
although she remained off drugs during her pregnancies, she was unable to main-
tain this after the children were born. She failed several treatment programs and
finally gave up. She did, however, take good care of her children. The house was
kept clean, her children were well fed and clothed, and they always had appropri-
ate activities. The children were doing well and were above age level developmen-
tally. She never took drugs in the presence of her children. The state kept trying
to remove the children and terminate her parental rights. They were unable to do
so, and the family has continued to do well.
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drugs. Programs in New York,22 6 Florida22 7 and California, 228 which pro-
vide comprehensive treatment services to women, have been successful in
stopping women from using drugs and in helping them remain drug-free,
therefore, giving birth to children who have either not been exposed to
drugs, or at the most, have had only minimal exposure. These approaches
do not coerce women into the program by the threat of incarceration or
226. See Susan Egelko et al., Treatment of Perinatal Cocaine Addiction: Use of the
Modified Therapeutic Community, 22 Am. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 185, 186-88
(1996) (explaining elements of perinatal treatment program at Bellevue Hospital
in New York City). This New York program found that as it was continued and
modified to meet the needs of pregnant women, the success rate for women re-
maining drug-free continued to rise. See id. at 200. In 1994, the year prior to the
evaluation of the program, 94.1% of the urine drug tests conducted on perinatal
clients were drug-free. See id. at 200-01 (comparing rise in success rate of perinatal
clients with success rate of non-perinatal clients). The program found that women
who started in the program early in their pregnancy were more likely to remain
drug-free after the birth of their child. Furthermore, additional components to
the treatment program, such as "intensive prenatal medical services for high-risk
pregnancies, parenting education, counseling and psychiatric management,"
helped women stay drug-free. Id. at 201.
227. See Mary E. Haskett et al., Intervention with Cocaine-Abusing Mothers, 73
FAMILIES SOC'Y: J. CONTEMP. HUM. SERVICES 451, 451-52 (1992) (examining need
for intervention and treatment for addicted mothers). Perinatal Support Services
(PSS) in Florida started a program to assist high-risk pregnant females with drug
treatment services. See id. at 453 (explaining child abuse prevention aspect of pro-
gram). The program included "childbirth education classes, infant-parenting clas-
ses and educational materials .... Counseling components include [d] one-to-one
crisis counseling and support, an independent-living-skills group, and an in-school
support and education group for pregnant teenagers. Finally, a core of trained
volunteers provide [d] support to individual clients through an Adopt-a-Mom pro-
gram." Id. at 454. Some of the identifiable components which led to the pro-
gram's success were early identification of addicted women, case management,
group supportive counseling, individual counseling, independent living skills
group, parenting class, in-home follow-up, education and training, and community
involvement. See id. at 454-58. The program administrators also identified the
need for two additional components-transitional aftercare housing and day
care-that would help the women transition into employment, school or training.
See id. at 459 (exploring future evolutions that would improve program already in
place).
228. See Claire Brindis et al., Options for Recovery: Promoting Perinatal Drug and
Alcohol Recovery, Child Health, and Family Stability, 27J. DRUG ISSUES 607 (1997) (dis-
cussing California's Option for Recovery Program). This California program was
developed as a collaborative effort by several state and local agencies. Case man-
agement services were available to the women prior to, during and after treatment.
The program recognized the need for services to help women deal with a variety of
issues such as "physical and sexual abuse, child abuse, inter-generational chemical
dependence, low self-esteem and depression, single parenthood, poverty, and
homelessness." Id. at 609. Women who were able to remain in a treatment pro-
gram for a longer period of time were more likely to remain drug-free. Further-
more, women who entered the program early in their pregnancy were much more
likely to deliver a drug-free child (77%) versus those who entered the program late
in their pregnancy or after giving birth (52%). Another important aspect of the
program was the focus on family maintenance and reunification. The program's
personnel recognized that it would take a strong commitment on the part of the
woman, her family and her community to ensure she remained drug-free.
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by removing their children, but rather attract them by education, counsel-
ing and quality services designed specifically to help addicted women.
IV. CONCLUSION
Even after the Ferguson decision, a South Carolina woman, who alleg-
edly killed her fetus by smoking crack cocaine when she was eight and a
half months pregnant, was convicted of homicide. child abuse by a jury
that deliberated for fifteen minutes. She was sentenced to twelve years in
prison, notwithstanding the split in expert testimony as to whether her use
of crack cocaine actually caused the baby's death. Causation in these cases
is often difficult to establish. The twenty-two year old woman had an IQ of
seventy-two, was homeless, had suffered beatings at the hands of abusive
men and had turned to crack only after her mother died. She was unable
to care for her three other children. 229 In South Carolina, a viable fetus is
considered a person, thus enabling these homicide prosecutions. 2 30 This
is not the first case in which South Carolina charged crack addicted wo-
men with homicide when their babies were stillborn. The others, how-
ever, pled guilty, and thus, did not make the newspapers. 23 1 At the same
time, South Carolina has a paucity of treatment services for addicted preg-
nant women. 2
32
I do not deny that addiction and crack babies are a significant health
and social problem in this country. Clearly, we must try harder to find
efficacious ways of treating addiction. Although the law assumes that the
use of drugs, even by an addict, is a voluntary act that is criminally culpa-
ble,23 3 to treat pregnant women who are crack addicts as ordinary
criminals who will be deterred by the imposition of incarceration is prob-
lematic and unnecessarily punitive. Drug addiction is tenacious and blurs
moral reasoning. The incessant drumbeat of desire and need drives al-
most everything. These women are in the gray area between criminals
who have unmitigated mens rea and those who are mentally ill. At the
very least, addicts have a diminished capacity for control. Granted, when
229. See Herbert, supra note 7, at A29 (noting that woman was also potentially
mentally challenged).
230. See Firestone, supra note 7, at All (stating that Regina McKnight was first
person in United States convicted of homicide of unborn fetus by smoking
cocaine).
231. See Herbert, supra note 7, at A29 (noting that most defendants are poor
and black).
232. See id. (commenting that although South Carolina leads in number of
prosecutions of pregnant women, it trails with regard to treatment).
233. Compare Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that
addiction is not a crime, and a person cannot be punished for his or her status,
only an act), with Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968) (finding that defen-
dant, who was found guilty of public intoxication, was punished for criminal act,
not for his alcoholic status), and United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1155 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (holding that although addict can be convicted of mere possession, his
sentence should be related to treatment).
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addicts take the first dose, it is voluntary and intentional. Not every per-
son, however, can foresee what will happen down the line. Although they
see addicts in their neighborhood, they assume that they are different and
can stop whenever they want. Speak to any confirmed smoker. In fact,
there are some addicted women who, when they get pregnant, stop using
drugs for the length of the pregnancy, 234 just as many women stop smok-
ing or drinking. For those who cannot, however, I do not believe that the
state should treat them as murderers or abusers. It may be necessary to
remove their children, but what gain is there in punishment which is
costly and does little to facilitate treatment?
Even removal and termination, which are also drastic approaches, are
not perfect solutions to the intractable problem of drug abusing pregnant
women. Removing children and terminating parental rights have serious
consequences for the child, the parents and society. Nevertheless, it is
sometimes necessary. But it is important to avoid unthinking, automatic
responses. Not every child should be removed from the home, even if the
mother is an addict. Each case must be separately evaluated, and the pau-
city of resources must be realistically examined before we decide to rup-
ture a family, even one that is far from ideal.
We may have to take unpleasant steps to protect children. We must,
however, do so carefully and with humility, because of our lack of knowl-
edge and resources. Otherwise, future generations will look back at our
treatment of crack addicted pregnant women in the same way we view the
past treatment of the insane, from which we derive the word bedlam. 235
234. For a further discussion, see supra note 154 and accompanying text.
235. Bedlam is defined as "a place or scene of wild mad uproar." WEBSTrR'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL EDITION 196 (1986). The word was derived from the
popular name of a hospital for the mentally insane in England. See id. (noting
name of hospital was Hospital of St. Mary of Bethlehem in London).
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